- Exposing the truth THEY don't want you to know

The Persian Gulf Deception
                       ***THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION***
                               (December, 1991)
                           (Revised:  Summer, 1992)

                              -Outline of Paper-

         A.  Introduction
         B.  Inconsistencies and Contradictions
         C.  The Deception
         D.  Confirmation
         E.  The Strategy
         F.  Conclusion

           *          *          *          *          *          *

                      "The great masses of the people...
      will more easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one."

                               (Adolph Hitler)

         "We have no right ever to forget that psychological warfare
                  is a struggle for winning people's minds."

                             (Mikhail Gorbachev)

           *          *          *          *          *          *

                          THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION


          "I have a great feeling of a great victory.  Anyone who dares
       even imply that we did not achieve  a  great  victory  obviously
       doesn't know what the hell he's talking about." (1)

                     {Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf}
             (Gulf War Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command)

     Since Gorbachev came to power in  the  Soviet  Union  there  have  been
 persistent  and  exceptional  historical contradictions in Soviet behavior.
 The consequence of this contradictory behavior has been the breakup of  the
 Soviet Union and the seeming demise of the 'communist' threat.
     Although  on the surface the apparent,  dramatic turn around in Kremlin
 thinking and the consequent collapse of  Soviet  communism  may  seem  like
 positive  developments  for  the West,  there is reason to believe they may
 actually not be.  Secular trends indicate there is a possibility  that  the
 Soviets have undermined their own political and economic power as part of a
 grand  deception.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that Russia is currently
 misleading the world for the purpose  of  global  military  domination.  An
 unprecedented  campaign of large-scale deceptions may be underway which has
 totally misled the West such that the East can now  successfully  launch  a
 surprise third world war. (2)

      The crisis in the Persian Gulf may have been a strategic deception
                            engineered by Moscow.

     For  America  and the West,  the Gulf Crisis had a sensational outcome.
 First off,  through the Gulf War the threat of Saddam Hussein was seemingly
 checked  and  Western interests in the Middle East were secured.  Secondly,
 the U.S.-led Coalition victory in the Gulf War  helped  the  United  States
 overcome  its  disgrace  in  Vietnam  and  reinstated  its  position as the
 dominant world hegemon.  Lastly, the positive resolution of the Gulf Crisis
 marked the beginning of  a  'New  World  Order'  in  which  the  threat  of
 militaristic  totalitarianism  appears  to  be dead and the superpowers are
 cooperating toward international peace and security.
     The problem with the Gulf Crisis and its positive outcome  is  that  it
 all  may have been literally too good to be true.  Something which the West
 seemed to conveniently overlook throughout the Crisis  was  that  Iraq  had
 been  a close ally of the Soviet Union for decades prior to the Invasion of
 Kuwait.  Consequently,  the humiliating defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq  in
 the Gulf War,  like the modern defeat of Soviet communism,  may have been a
 deception- an inherently contradictory lie.  There  is  reason  to  believe
 that  Saddam intentionally provoked the Gulf War with the sole intention of
 handing the West a 'great victory'.  He would have done this in cooperation
 with Moscow as an important part of an overall strategy to mislead America,
 its Western allies,  and the world  as  a  whole,  so  that  the  East  can
 successfully  launch  a  surprise attack against the West.  In other words,
 when it comes right down to it,  the  Gulf  Crisis  and  subsequent  Allied
 victory over Iraq may have in actuality been nothing but a seductive lie.
     In  the  following pages I will thoroughly examine how the Persian Gulf
 Crisis may have been a deception.  There will be four major parts.  In part
 I, numerous inconsistencies and contradictions associated with the behavior
 of Iraq and the Soviets throughout the  Gulf  Crisis  will  be  brought  to
 light.  In  the  second  part,  a  circumstantial  case will be built for a
 Persian  Gulf  deception  based  upon  the  implications   of   the   given
 inconsistencies  and  contradictions.   This  case  will  be  confirmed  by
 directly incriminating evidence in part III.  In the final  part,  possible
 strategic aims of a Persian Gulf deception will be discussed.

                -Part I:  Inconsistencies and Contradictions-


     Iraq's   Invasion   of  Kuwait  was  inconsistent-  it  was  a  blatant
 provocation for war with the West that went against Iraq's best interest.

     Going into the Gulf Crisis Iraq had become a major military threat, and
 potential target, for the West.  During the 1980's, Saddam Hussein built-up
 one of the largest militaries  in  the  world.  By  1990,  he  commanded  a
 million-man  army equipped with a vast arsenal of modern weaponry including
 over 4500 tanks,  almost 5000 artillery pieces,  and upwards of 800  combat
 aircraft  (3).  Saddam  also  controlled hundreds of anti-ship missiles and
 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles,  as well as a stockpile of  chemical
 and  possibly  biolological munitions.  During the 1980's Iraq developed an
 extensive  military  infrastructure  involving  a  comprehensive   command,
 control, communications, and intelligence (C,3I) network.  By the summer of
 1990,   throughout  Iraq  were  radar  stations,  anti-aircraft  artillery,
 surface-to-air missile  batteries,  and  weapons  production  plants  which
 included   facilities   for  the  research  and  development  of  chemical,
 biological, and nuclear weapons. (4)
     As Iraqi military power grew,  the West became  increasingly  concerned
 about  its  expanding regional influence.  In early May of 1990- just prior
 to the Gulf Crisis- 'The New Republic' warned:

          "The  prospect of Saddam Hussein as top man in the Arab world
       and dominant power in the Persian Gulf is not one that civilized
       people should welcome.  This man is a  ruthless  killer  with  a
       deep paranoia about the West and grandiose ambitions to be a new
       Nasser  and  to  re-create  the  glories  that  were Babylon and
       Mesopotamia." (5)

     All in all,  going into the Invasion of Kuwait,  the West saw Iraq as a
 dangerous military threat and destabilizing force in the richest oil region
 of  the  world.  Saddam's growing military power,  coupled with his staunch
 anti-Israeli and anti-Western mindset, was becoming a major concern for the
 West.  Iraq could someday unify the Arab world such that the West would  be
 held  hostage  by  its  oil dependency.  Even worse,  Iraq could eventually
 unleash a major regional war involving weapons of  mass  destruction  which
 could  result  in  the destruction of Israel.  By 1990,  Saddam Hussein had
 come to embody many of "the serious security problems of the post-cold  war
 era:  aggression,  terrorism, virulant tribalism, and missile, nuclear, and
 chemical weapons proliferation" (6).
     In the weeks and months before Iraq's Invasion of  Kuwait,  Saddam  was
 putting  out  some  not-so-subtle  hints  as to his belligerent intentions,
 giving the West an opportunity to consider  the  possibility  of  a  future
 confrontation.  In a speech made on April 3rd,  1990,  Saddam threatened to
 "make fire eat up half of Israel",  a comment which drew widespread Western
 consternation  (7).  In  May,  U.S.  officials  confirmed press rumors that
 Saddam told Kuwait:  "Iraqi security may  require  him  to  occupy  Kuwaiti
 territory  in  the  future" (8).  Such bellicose remarks likely led Western
 leaders to consider possible responses should Iraq become aggressive in the
     As Iraq began to blatantly threaten Kuwait in late July  of  1990,  the
 United  States  made  it clear that it would respond forcefully if need be.
 The prevailing sentiment of America's leaders at that time was reflected by
 Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato who denounced Saddam as:  "...a butcher,
 a  killer,  a bully.  Some day we're going to have to stand up to him.  Why
 not now?" (9).  The State Department announced that the United States would
 "remain strongly committed to  supporting  the  individual  and  collective
 self-defence  of our friends in the Gulf,  with whom we have deep and long-
 standing ties" (10).  To underscore America's willingness to  use  military
 force  against  Iraq  should  events  warrant  such  action,  a joint naval
 exercise with the United Arab Emirates was hastily arranged  and  initiated
 in the northern Gulf (11).
     Apparently  unintimidated by American posturing,  on August 2nd,  1990,
 Saddam proved good on his word and Iraq invaded Kuwait.  The West  received
 the  opportunity it needed to do something decisive about the growing Iraqi
 threat.  Almost immediately, the United States and its Western Allies began
 preparing for a  war  against  Iraq.  Saddam's  military  empire  could  be
 forcefully  checked  before Iraqi regional influence grew too far or before
 Iraq's military might  became  too  strong-  eventually  including  nuclear
     Saddam's  provocation  was  ideal  for  a  decisive  Western   military
 response.  As  the 1991-92 'American Defense Annual' later put it:  "Saddam
 Hussein...  proved to be a near perfect villian,  and the coalition aligned
 against  him  had  a  compelling  'casus belli'" (12).  A ruthless military
 dictator,  infamous for gassing his own  people,  blitzkrieged  the  small,
 peaceful  nation  of  Kuwait  in  blatant  violation  of international law.
 What's more,  Saddam's Invasion resulted in Iraq's control of over a  third
 of  the  world's available oil reserves and "put his forces within striking
 distance of one of the world's most critical resources,  Saudi Arabia's oil
 fields,  making it necessary for the United States and other nations to act
 to counter him,  instead of just issuing protest  statements"  (13).  As  a
 whole,  through the Kuwaiti Invasion,  Saddam had come to threaten half the
 world's oil, a situation wholly intolerable to the oil-dependent West.
     Between the Invasion and the beginning of the Gulf War,  Iraq continued
 to behave in a seemingly irrational manner that was inconsistent  with  its
 own interests but favorable to Western interests.
     In the wake of Saddam's overrun of Kuwait, international pressure,  led
 by  the  West,  began  to  build  on  Iraq to withdraw.  Immediately,  U.N.
 Resolution 660 was ratified which called for the  unconditional  withdrawal
 of Iraq from Kuwait (14).  Within days, U.S. military forces began flooding
 into Saudi Arabia.  With Saddam remaining intransigent,  the United Nations
 decided to impose international economic sanctions against  Iraq.  As  Iraq
 failed to respond, military forces from across the globe began flowing into
 the Gulf along side the growing American build-up.  On November 29th,  with
 a sizable Coalition force already in place,  the U.N.  okayed a  resolution
 for  the  forceful  removal of Iraq from Kuwait by a U.S.-led international
 Coalition should Saddam's forces not  unilaterally  leave  by  January  15,
 1991. (15)
     Saddam's  intransigence  as  international pressure began to build made
 little sense.  It  was  apparent,  given  the  scale  of  the  American-led
 military build-up in Saudi Arabia,  that,  beyond freeing Kuwait,  the West
 was preparing to use the Invasion of Kuwait as an excuse to destroy  Iraq's
 military  potential  and,  in  turn,  the  threat  Saddam  posed to Western
 interests in the Middle East.  Any sort  of  compromise  or  moderation  on
 Saddam's  part  could  have  easily  undone  Western  attempts  to organize
 international support for a war and, in turn, resulted in substantial Iraqi
 gains.  In John Bulloch's and Harvey Morris' 'Saddam's War',  it is pointed
 out that:

          "Had   he  (Saddam)  contented  himself  with  occupying  the
       disputed islands of Bubiyan and Warbah and that  sector  of  the
       Rumeileh  oilfield  which he claimed as his own,  it is unlikely
       the United Nations would have  gone  beyond  the  imposition  of
       unenforceable  sanctions,  or  that the United States would have
       dispatched a single  soldier  to  the  region...  Had  a  puppet
       government  been  left  in  charge  of  a  nominally independent
       Kuwait,  it would eventually have received some recognition,  at
       least from the Arab world." (16)

     Instead of  moderation,  however,  Saddam  remained  almost  completely
 intransigent  and  belligerent toward the West.  He persistently made clear
 his unwillingness to be persuaded  by  Western  intimidation.  He  declared
 Kuwait  to  have always been a part of Iraq and let the world know that all
 of Iraqi  sovereignty-  including  Kuwait-  would  be  militarily  defended
 against any hostile actions.  Furthermore,  Saddam called on moslems around
 the world to rise up and launch a holy war,  or  'jihad',  against  Western
 imperialism. (17)
     Saddam  sometimes,  and  usually  at the wrong times,  failed to behave
 according to the belligerent image he painted of himself.
     Iraqi forces never preempted the build-up of the American-led Coalition
 in Saudi Arabia.  Saddam conveniently stood back as nations from  all  over
 the  world,  particularly  in  the  West,  mobilized and imported a massive
 military force.  Yet,  attacking while the  Coalition  was  incomplete  and
 disorganized  may  have  undermined the Coalition's ability to successfully
 wage a war.  Unfortunately,  as is pointed out  in  the  1991-92  'American
 Defense  Annual':  "It  seems  unlikely that future enemies will graciously
 grant U.S. forces five months to prepare for battle" (18).
     Even more inconsistent than failing to preempt was Saddam's release  of
 Western  hostages.  There can be little doubt that:  "One act of great good
 fortune was Saddam Hussein's decision to release his hostages,  those human
 shields  whose continued presence in Iraq would have vastly complicated the
 air war" (19).  Specifically,  Saddam made hostages out of the thousands of
 Western  civilians  (including  over 3000 Americans) who had been living in
 Kuwait or Iraq when the Gulf Crisis broke out.  He threatened to  use  them
 as  'human  shields' by placing them in strategic targets in order to deter
 any approaching Coalition attack.  These hostages became  one  of  Saddam's
 only  major  trump  cards  against  a  U.S.-led  attack.  It was apparent a
 Coalition bombing campaign that would cost thousands  of  innocent  Western
 lives would have exceptionally high political costs for our leaders.  In an
 act  of  goodwill  totally  uncharacteristic  of  the 'Butcher of Baghdad',
 however,  Saddam released the hostages.  The only major concession he  made
 before  the  Gulf War was profoundly self-contradictory in that it directly
 undermined his stated intention to inflict  as  much  damage  and  pain  as
 possible  on  the West.  In fact,  Saddam spared the lives of Westerners at
 the cost of Iraqi lives later lost in unhampered Coalition bombings.

     The deadline of January 15th eventually passed and  the  U.S.-Coalition
 attacked the very next day.  The Gulf War was underway as well as continued
 inconsistencies and contradictions.

     As  General  Powell  correctly  pointed  out  the  following  day,  the
 Coalition somehow 'caught Iraq off guard' and achieved tactical surprise in
 its post-deadline air-attack (20).  This, of course, is absurd.  Going into
 the Gulf War,  Iraq had one of the most experienced and hardened militaries
 in the world.  It had just completed an almost decade-long, modern war with
 Iran.  Furthermore,  Iraq  was  equipped  with  a sophisticated Soviet C,3I
 network.  To top it all off,  Iraq had several months  going  into  January
 15th to prepare its defenses and a military response should war come.  Yet,
 Saddam's  war-machine  was  somehow surprised by a *deadline*-attack.  Upon
 the initial wave of the air campaign there was little or no immediate Iraqi
 response:  no defensive black-out  of  Baghdad  (something  they  had  been
 rehearsing),  no  immediate retaliatory SCUD missile strikes,  and no Iraqi
 air- or ground-counteroffensive.  Fortunately for the  Coalition,  all  its
 planes  ran into was well-lit targets,  inept Iraqi air defenses,  and some
 sporadic dog-fights.  Tactical surprise allowed the  Coalition  to  swiftly
 disable Saddam's war-machine with minimum associated costs.
     During the air-campaign,  the only significant counterattack from  Iraq
 was   random   SCUD  missile  attacks  against  Israel  and  Saudi  Arabia.
 Fortunately, however, chemical weapons were never involved.  Of course, why
 weren't they?  It was not that Saddam lacked such weapons for in the  War's
 aftermath  U.N.  inspectors  have found dozens of Al-Hussein chemical SCUDs
 which survived Coalition bombings (21).  Saddam decided not to use chemical
 SCUDs even though such restraint  contradicted  both  the  threats  he  was
 making and the image he was conveying prior to and during the Gulf War.  If
 Saddam  really  wished  to spread the conflict and set-off a holy war as he
 persistently claimed he would,  hitting Israel with  chemical  SCUDs  would
 have  been an ideal provocation.  It is doubtful that Saddam feared Israeli
 retaliation given that  Iraq  was  already  stomaching  over  two  thousand
 Coalition sorties a day and Israeli involvement was the intended goal.  All
 in  all,  it  makes  little  sense that Saddam failed to use chemical SCUDs
 during the Gulf War against Israel or any of  Iraq's  enemies,  whereas  he
 gassed his own people only a couple of years before. (22)
     In  late  February,  the  Coalition ground-offensive got underway,  but
 again no chemical weapons were involved.  Apparently, Saddam disallowed the
 use of any of  the  tens-of-thousands  of  chemical  artillery  shells  and
 chemical  mines  in  the  Iraqi arsenal (23).  This is surprising given how
 these weapons were employed with great success  during  the  Iran-Iraq  War
 (24).  The  fact that chemical munitions were not used by the Iraqis is but
 another inconsistency on the part of Saddam which was to the benefit of the
 U.S. and the Coalition forces.
     By March,  Kuwait was repatriated and Saddam had managed  to  suffer  a
 defeat  that  seemed  beyond human reasoning.  With all said and done,  the
 U.S.-Coalition had succeeded in a total  military  'rout'  of  Iraq's  war-
 hardened,  well-equipped,  million-man army and hardly got scratched in the
 process.  After six-weeks of Allied aerial bombardment involving upwards of
 100,000 sorties and 141,000 tons of bombs,  Saddam's vast  war-machine  was
 left  decimated at the cost of only a few dozen Coalition planes (25).  Any
 of Saddam's forces in Kuwait that escaped destruction during the  Coalition
 air-campaign  proceeded  to be encircled and destroyed in a 100-hour Allied
 ground offensive.  When the War was over,  more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers
 had  been killed,  300,000 were injured,  and around 150,000 had been taken
 prisoner (26).  In causing this immense massacre,  the Allies suffered only
 468  casualties:  149  dead,  81  missing-in-action,  and 238 wounded (27).
 Through the Gulf War Saddam lost some 4000 tanks,  2000  artillery  pieces,
 2000  armored personnel carriers (APCs),  100 aircraft,  and 80 ships (28).
 Furthermore,  Iraq's infrastructure suffered what the U.N.  later described
 as  'near-apocalyptic'  damage (29).  The Allies,  on the other hand,  lost
 only 4 tanks,  1 artillery piece,  9 APCs,  44 aircraft,  and 2 ships (30).
 All  in  all,  Saddam's  defeat at the hands of the West was so drastic and
 humiliating as to be utterly nonsensical.
     With the Gulf War over, the West had reason to breathe a sigh of relief
 at home.  Fortunately,  there had  been  no  major  anti-Western  terrorist
 attacks associated with the Crisis.  Of course, why weren't there?  The CIA
 "picked  up  all  the  tell-tale  signs  of Iraq's ability to wage chemical
 warfare and launch terrorist attacks around the Middle East  and  Europe...
 Intelligence analysts are still scratching their heads, wondering why these
 capabilities  were  not used (31)".  In other words,  Saddam refrained from
 launching terrorist attacks just as he failed to wage chemical attacks even
 though he was fully capable of and supposedly intending to do  both.  Thus,
 since there was no terrorism, Saddam acted in a contradictory manner which,
 once again, was favorable to the West.
     In the wake of the Gulf War, one of the greatest inconsistencies of all
 concerning Saddam's behavior has come to light.  U.N. inspections following
 the Gulf War ceasefire have revealed that Iraq's program to develop nuclear
 weapons,  code-named  'Project  Babylon'  (32),  was  far  larger  and more
 successful than had ever been suspected in the West.  In fact,  it is today
 believed that Iraq may have been less than a year away from having at least
 a  few  crude  nuclear weapons when it invaded Kuwait (33).  Of course,  if
 Saddam was interested in taking on the West and fighting the "Mother of All
 Battles",  why did he make his challenge when he did?  Why didn't he wait a
 year  until  he had the Bomb?  Why did Saddam invade Kuwait and fight a war
 with the West before developing the ultimate means by which to fulfill  his
 grandiose ambitions?

                                -The Soviets-

     Throughout   the   Persian   Gulf   Crisis   the   Soviets  behaved  as
 inconsistently as Saddam's Iraq.

     For  the  Gulf  Crisis,   Soviet  foreign  policy  did  an  about-face.
 Throughout  most  of  the  United  Nation's  history,  Moscow  had tried to
 undermine any Western efforts to  bring  about  international  cooperation,
 particularly  if  such  cooperation was to somehow serve Western interests.
 Yet, for the Gulf Crisis,  this was not so.  For the first time since World
 War  II the Soviets cooperated with the West in organizing an international

     The effort they finally chose to support was blatantly  in  the  West's
 interest and against their own.

     The  oil-shock stemming from the Gulf Crisis was devastating to Western
 economic vitality.  The West desperately  needed  a  way  to  resecure  its
 supply of cheap oil from the Persian Gulf by freeing Kuwait and eliminating
 the  Iraqi  threat.  Without  the  okay  of  the  Soviets and international
 support this may never have been possible and the West's economy  may  very
 well have been plunged into depression.
     For the Soviets, on the other hand, higher oil-prices stemming from the
 Gulf  Crisis  was  a blessing.  At the time,  Soviet Russia was the world's
 largest producer and second largest exporter of oil.  Hence, the sharp rise
 in oil prices meant windfall profits of hard  foreign  currency-  something
 the Soviets greatly needed.  Given the price at which oil topped-out during
 the Crisis,  the Soviets could have hoped to increase  their  hard-currency
 earnings by nearly $40 billion a year. (34)
     Beyond  oil  interests,  Saddam  Hussein's Iraq was a valuable ally and
 military client which the Soviets should have wanted to keep.
     By 1990, the Soviets had a long-standing and deeply-vested relationship
 with Iraq.  In 1972,  Moscow and Baghdad signed a 'Treaty of Friendship and
 Cooperation'  (35).  Over the next two decades the Soviets poured thousands
 of  military  'advisers'  and  other  specialists  into  Iraq  who  trained
 Baghdad's  general  staff  and  planning  officers as well as organized its
 intelligence services (36).  Soviet involvement in Iraq became particularly
 deep after Saddam Hussein came to power in  1979.  Guided  by  a  Stalinist
 philosophy,  Saddam  wanted  to  model Iraq after the Soviet military state
 (37).  He affirmed his commitment to  Moscow  when  he  came  to  power  by
 signing  an  agreement  with  Soviet  Defense  Minister Ustinov on military
 cooperation and strategic consultation (38).  After making  the  agreement,
 the  Soviets  helped Saddam carry out a large-scale campaign to consolidate
 power within Iraq and become a  regional  military  superpower.  Reflecting
 Moscow's  involvement,  eight  military facilities were constructed in Iraq
 for Soviet use including both air bases and naval ports (39).  All in  all,
 by  the  Kuwaiti  Invasion,  the  Soviet Union had invested a great deal of
 time,  energy,  and resources in the construction of Saddam's  totalitarian
 regime and modern war-machine- an investment they likely meant to make good
     In  developing  its  massive  war-machine,  Iraq became an ideal Soviet
 military clientele  state.  During  the  1980's  Iraq  became  the  world's
 largest  importer  of  arms.  It  is  estimated  that between 1980 and 1990
 Saddam spent some $100 billion dollars on military equipment (that compares
 to just under $70 billion spent on arms by Britian  or  France  during  the
 same period) (40).  Since 90 percent of Iraq's military was bought from the
 Soviets,  it  should be apparent just how valuable a customer Saddam was to
     Since Iraq purchased most of its arms from the Soviets  on  credit,  it
 was  in  Moscow's  interest to maintain Saddam's regime and Iraq's economic
 vitality.  Going into  the  Gulf  Crisis,  Baghdad  owed  Moscow  some  $80
 billion.  For 1990 alone,  the Soviets were expecting to receive $2 billion
 from Iraq (41).  Given the seeming  economic  distress  in  Soviet  Russia,
 preserving Iraq's economic potential should have been important to them.
     In a nutshell, the Soviets should not have wanted to turn their back on
 Iraq  during the Gulf Crisis.  As 'Times' columnist A.M.  Rosenthal pointed
 out at the time, doing so meant that:

          "Moscow will lose its only remaining ally in the area.  Also:
       its best customer for weapons.  Also: the military and political
       prestige it invested in Saddam Hussein for so long." (42)

     The principal reason Moscow forged a close  relationship  with  Baghdad
 and  made  such  a  deep military commitment is because Iraq has tremendous
 geopolitical strategic value.  Iraq is at the heart of the Persian Gulf and
 the richest oil-region in the world.  Thus, it is a focal point not only of
 the Arab world,  but also of vital Western energy interests.  A foothold in
 Iraq  enhanced  Moscow's  influence  over  other  Arab nations and gave the
 Soviets access to the aquilles heel of the oil-dependent West.
     Because of Iraq's strategic value,  it was widely believed the  Soviets
 would never let the West attack and defeat Saddam Hussein.  Such a scenario
 entailed  a  shift in the regional balance of power that compromised Soviet
 interests and benefitted the West.  Just prior to the Gulf  War,  'Aviation
 Week and Space Technology' reported:

           "...the  destruction of Iraq's military,  if it came to that,
        would augment the strategic weight of Israel and Iran.  This  is
        not in Soviet interests." (43)

 At  the Hoover Institute,  a national defense think-tank,  experts believed
 that the Soviets would "do everything in  their  power  to  keep  that  man
 (Saddam)  in there...  They do not want that part of the world dominated by
 us" (44).

     All in all,  Moscow had  vested  interests  in  its  relationship  with
 Baghdad  such  that  they  should have stood behind,  or at least sought to
 protect, Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Gulf Crisis.  Yet,  they did not.
 In  fact,  they  opened  the way for the West to launch a war against their
 valuable Iraqi ally:

          "The importance of Soviet cooperation cannot  be  overstated.
       If  the Soviets had pursued their traditional policy of blocking
       agreements at the United Nations and defending their prothghs in
       the  Middle  East,  not  only  would  united  action  have  been
       impossible  but  fear  of  provoking  a superpower confrontation
       might well have deterred the United States from acting." (45)

     Although at least some contemplation  would  have  been  expected,  the
 Soviets turned their back on Saddam and helped out the West immediately and
 without  reservation.  On  the  day of the Invasion,  American Secretary of
 State James Baker was visiting his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze,
 in Siberia.  On news of the Invasion, the two got together, and within just
 a couple  of  hours  they  had  worked  out  the  draft  wording  for  U.N.
 Resolution   660  which  called  for  an  immediate,   unconditional  Iraqi
 withdrawal from Kuwait. (46)
     As Western forces began piling into the Gulf,  Moscow failed to use its
 diplomatic  leverage  over  Saddam  to  remove Iraq from Kuwait.  This,  of
 course,  makes little sense  given  what  the  Soviets  had  to  gain  from
 preserving  Iraq.  Yet,  while  a  diplomatic  solution  was still possible
 before Iraq was destroyed by Western military force,  the  Soviets  sat  on
 their  hands.  If  they  were interested in seeing a peaceful resolution to
 the Crisis they should have been able to produce one since the Soviet Union
 was Iraq's principal political-  and  military-supporter.  It  is  apparent
 that:  "The  Soviet  Union is the one power that could have brought Iraq to
 terms early on if Moscow had really clenched its fist" (47).
     In fact,  Saddam may have backed down  if  only  the  Soviets  informed
 Baghdad  of  their  willingness  to  let the U.S.-led Coalition attack.  In
 'Saddam's War', the authors revealed:

          "In Baghdad,  officials told us that they had their links  to
       Moscow,  and they were quite certain that at the Helsinki summit
       in mid-September the influence of Soviet military thinking  made
       Gorbachev  hold  back  from  any  endorsement of military action
       against Iraq if sanctions proved  ineffective.  Whether  or  not
       this  was true,  the Iraqis firmly believed that it was and that
       Soviet  generals  would  prevent  any  attack  on   them.   This
       perception   undoubtedly  influenced  the  Baghdad  government's
       policy of brinksmanship." (48)

     As war approached the Soviets  actually  helped  prepare  the  U.S.-led
 effort to destroy Iraq.  They fed the West important codes and intelligence
 on  the  Iraqi  military  which  simplified the Coalition's offensive (49).
 Hence,  the Soviets went extraordinarily out of their way to  facilitate  a
 Western-led attack against their valuable ally.

                          -Part II:  The Deception-

     What  can be drawn from the above inconsistencies and contradictions in
 Iraqi and Soviet behavior?  Quite simply,  it appears  something  seriously
 afoul may have been underlying the Persian Gulf Crisis.  'Contra'-'diction'
 entails that something is contrary to what it appears to mean.  This is the
 essence  of  a  lie.  The  contradictions  associated  with the Gulf Crisis
 indicate that it may have been some sort of lie- the opposite  of  what  it
 appeared to be.
     There  was  a  prevailing  and  consistent  theme  to the contradictory
 behavior of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the  Soviet  Union  during  the  Gulf
 Crisis.  Both  nations  persistently  acted  in  a  way  that facilitated a
 sensational Western Gulf War victory over Iraq.  If,  as part of  a  large-
 scale  deception,  Soviet Russia and Saddam's Iraq were working together to
 bring about the Gulf War and have Iraq decisively lose to  the  West,  then
 the  seemingly  inconsistent  and irrational behavior of Bagdhad and Moscow
 makes sense.
     Saddam's Invasion of Kuwait was an ideal provocation to lure  the  West
 into launching a war against Iraq.  By 1990, the increasing threat posed by
 Saddam's radical anti-Western policies, growing military power, and nuclear
 weapons development program,  most likely had the West seeking an excuse to
 stop Iraq short.  As Saddam began to make belligerent threats, increasingly
 directed at Kuwait,  the West was given ample time to muse the  possibility
 of  fighting  a  needed  war  against  Iraq.  When  Saddam actually invaded
 Kuwait,  there was a blatant violation of international law and half of the
 world's  known  oil  reserves came under an Iraqi threat- the West received
 both an ideal excuse and an unavoidable provocation to  wage  a  mitigating
 war against Saddam's military empire.
     Following the Invasion, the Soviets made it easy for the West to launch
 a  war  against Iraq.  With the U.S.  Secretary of State already in Russia,
 Moscow was able to immediately cooperate and  the  initial  U.N.  call  for
 Iraq  to withdraw from Kuwait resulted.  The reason the Soviets didn't take
 time to contemplate their response is because they had  preplanned  it.  As
 the  U.S.  worked  with  the international community to set the stage for a
 full-scale war against Iraq,  the Soviets continued to cooperate  including
 their  okay for the use of military force against their Iraqi ally.  As the
 deadline for war  approached,  Moscow  made  sure  not  to  use  diplomatic
 pressure  to get Saddam to back down because the intent was to make way for
 a Western attack.
     Going into the January 15th deadline,  Saddam made sure the West  could
 go   through  with  the  War  it  desired  by  remaining  intransigent  and
 belligerent.  Even as it became apparent that the Coalition force was  more
 than large enough to overwhelm Iraq, Saddam failed to compromise on Kuwait.
     Saddam  took  steps  prior  to  the  Gulf  War  to  open  the way for a
 successful Coalition attack with minimum potential costs for the  West.  By
 failing  to  preempt  the build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia,  Iraq made it
 easy for the U.S.-led Coalition to achieve a military superiority and fully
 organize itself,  thus facilitating Western success.  On top  of  this,  by
 releasing his Western 'human shield' hostages, Saddam removed a substantial
 mitigating  factor  to  a  Coalition  air-attack  and  greatly  reduced the
 potential costs the West would face in launching a war,  both in  terms  of
 Western lives and consequent political costs.
     For the initial Coalition air-attack,  Saddam left his forces off-guard
 and unprepared,  allowing the Allies the advantage  of  tactical  surprise.
 Targets were left vulnerable,  no initial military response was prepared or
 executed, and defensive responses were subdued, thus the door was left open
 for the the Allies to  swiftly  disable  the  potential  of  Saddam's  war-
 machine.  This  gave  the West an inflated sense of technical and strategic
 superiority, something which would be further fed throughout the War.
     As the War progressed and Saddam's empire  was  being  decimated,  Iraq
 refrained from using chemical weapons so that the West's Gulf victory would
 be  clean-cut  and total.  Saddam made sure not to hit Israel with chemical
 SCUDs in that such a  provocation  would  have  surely  elicited  a  potent
 Israeli  military response.  Israeli involvement in the Gulf War could have
 easily led to a breakup of the Coalition  and  possibly  spawned  a  larger
 regional conflict.  By keeping chemical weapons off the battlefield, Saddam
 minimized  Coalition  casualties and kept the conflict from escalating in a
 way which could have led to a breakdown in international  support  for  the
 War  and/or threatened the Coalition's cohesion.  All in all,  by not using
 chemical weapons,  Saddam minimized Western losses- both in terms of  lives
 and  associated  political costs,  thus insuring that the victory handed to
 the West was total.
     Throughout the whole affair there was no associated terrorism  so  that
 the  deception  would  go  smoothly  and  Soviet  involvement  would remain
 undiscovered.  Extensive evidence has been uncovered which  indicates  that
 Moscow  has been behind much of international terrorism (50).  Thus,  there
 is reason to believe that,  prior to the Gulf Crisis,  the Kremlin may have
 put  out  some  sort  of restraining order on both Saddam and international
 terrorist organizations in general.  This would  have  been  done  for  two
 reasons.  First  off,  it was important to constrain hostilities as much as
 possible to the Persian Gulf region.  Aggravating other tensions,  such  as
 between  the  Arabs  and  Israel,  would have threatened both international
 support for the Gulf War and the exceptional nature of the West's  victory.
 Secondly,  terrorism  could  have opened up linkages to Moscow that Western
 intelligence might discover and trace, thus leading to an uncovering of the

     When the Gulf War ended and Iraq had been forced  from  Kuwait,  Saddam
 had  managed  to  achieve  exactly  what  he  intended  from the start.  He
 suffered a drastic,  humiliating defeat while inflicting minimal damage  on
 the  U.S.-led  Coalition.  Thus,  the West was handed a sensational,  total
 victory in the Gulf.

     As  for  the  surprising  extent  of  Iraq's  nuclear  program,  Saddam
 challenged  the  West  before he had the Bomb because 'Project Babylon' was
 most valuable as bait for a Western  attack.  Should  Saddam  have  invaded
 Kuwait  once Iraq had nuclear weapons,  the odds are that there never would
 have been a Gulf War,  and,  if there was,  it wouldn't have been a  'great
 victory' for the West.
     If it seems difficult to believe that Saddam might have staged the Gulf
 Crisis under Kremlin order, simply consider the alternative: How could have
 Saddam invaded Kuwait without Moscow's knowledge and consent?

     In a New Republic article, 'Virtual Ally: What's the Soviet Game in the
 Gulf', which came out just after the Crisis erupted, Edward Jay Epstein, an
 expert on Soviet intelligence, asked the provocative question:

          "Did the USSR have advance knowledge of  well-designed  Iraqi
       plans  to  invade Kuwait?  After all,  unlike the United States,
       the Soviet Union had military advisers in Iraq attached  to  the
       helicopter,  tank,  logistic,  and  radar  units  used  for  the
       invasion,  and the KGB presumably had developed sources from the
       three  generations  of Iraqi staff and planning officers trained
       by Moscow?" (51)

     As for consent,  according to Claudia Wright of 'Foreign  Affairs',  in
 the  1980's  the  U.S.  State  Department  thought of Saddam Hussein as "so
 beholden to the Soviet Union as  to  be  incapable  of  autonomous  foreign
 policy" (52).  Given how dependent Iraq was on the Soviets- particularly in
 building  up  and  maintaining  its  military strength,  and given Saddam's
 Stalinist,  pro-Soviet mind-set,  it's unlikely  Baghdad  would  have  ever
 pulled-off  a  stunt  as reckless and potentially costly as invading Kuwait
 without first seeking Moscow's approval.  This is particularly  true  since
 it  would  have  been nearly impossible to develop and carry out such plans
 without the Soviets noticing.
     All in all,  there is good reason to believe  California  Senator  Bill
 Richardson  who  remarked,  "there  is  little  doubt that the Soviets were
 apprised of the invasion before it happened,  helped plan it  and  approved
 it.  There  is  no way communist puppet Saddam Hussein would have given the
 order to invade Kuwait if it were not sanctioned by Gorbachev (53)."

           *          *          *          *          *          *

                       ***THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION***

                           -Part III: Confirmation-

     The idea that the Gulf Crisis was an  intentional  deception  and  that
 Moscow  was  fundamentally  behind  the  whole  affair is confirmed by some
 directly incriminating evidence.

     There was strong evidence that the Soviets were  involved  with  Iraq's
 Invasion  of Kuwait.  First off,  two weeks prior to the Invasion,  Colonel
 General Albert Makashov, former commander of the Volga-Urals Command,  went
 to  Baghdad  as  a Soviet 'military counseler' (54).  Since Iraq's military
 command would have had difficulty handling  an  operation  as  logistically
 complex  as  the  Kuwaiti  Invasion,  there  is reason to believe Makashov,
 and/or  other  Russian  commanders,   oversaw   the   Invasion.   This   is
 substantiated by the fact that there were Soviet military advisers attached
 to  the  Iraqi  helicopter,  tank,  logistic,  and radar units used for the
 Invasion of Kuwait (55).  Also,  1200 Iraqi military personnel  were  being
 trained  by Soviet specialists at Odessa,  inside the Soviet Union,  around
 the time of the Invasion (56).  Further evidence of Moscow's complicity  in
 the  Invasion  stems  from  the  fact  that the Soviets sold or transferred
 military spare parts to Saddam for at least five days following the  August
 2nd  Invasion  (57).  What's  more,  when the U.S.  began surveillance over
 Kuwait in the wake of the Invasion,  there  were  indications  that  Soviet
 technicians  helped  the Iraqi air force jam intelligence and eavesdropping
 on flights by American aircraft (58).
     There  was  also  strong  evidence  of  Soviet  complicity  with   Iraq
 throughout the Gulf War.  On numerous occasions allied forces heard Russian
 language   communiques  on  Iraqi  military  radios.   Following  the  War,
 returning U.S.  soldiers said they saw evidence in the  field  that  Soviet
 advisers  were  working  along  with  Iraqi  forces.  According to F.  Andy
 Messing,  executive director of the National  Defense  Council  Foundation,
 there  were  over two dozen documented cases that showed Soviet involvement
 in Iraq during the Gulf War. "The Soviets were all over the place", Messing
 reported,  Soviet advisers "continued to tune radars,  fix tanks and planes
 and  advise (Iraqi) combat units down to the battalion level".  In a Senate
 Foreign Relations briefing paper published  February  21st,  1991,  it  was
 reported that:  "For two days in February, Russian language and voices were
 communicating over  Iraqi  military  networks".  Furthermore,  the  Soviets
 repositioned  satellites over the Gulf region and were "supplying targeting
 information to  the  Iraqis  for  mobile  missile  launchers".  The  report
 outlined  how  Soviet  advisers  were "helping Iraqis fire SCUD missiles at
 Israel and Saudi Arabia".  On February 25th,  two days after the ground war
 began,  former  Defense  Secretary  Caspar  Weinberger  said  during  a BBC
 interview that the Soviet Union was still supplying arms to  Iraq.  Despite
 the   strong  evidence  of  Soviet  complicity,   the  Kremlin  denied  any
 involvement with Iraq and assured the West that its advisers and  personnel
 were pulled out soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait. (59)

     All in all, there appears to be sufficient indirect and direct evidence
 to  believe that the Persian Gulf Crisis was a Soviet-engineered deception.
 The  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  in  Iraqi  and  Soviet  behavior
 throughout  the  Gulf  Crisis  build  a  strong  circumstantial  case for a
 deception in the Gulf.  Based upon the direct evidence above,  there  seems
 little  doubt  that  the  Soviets  were  both  aware of and involved in the
 Invasion  of  Kuwait.   Furthermore,   it  is  clear   that   the   Soviets
 underhandedly  backed  the  Iraqis  throughout  the  Gulf War.  The logical
 explanation  for  the  directly  incriminating   evidence   is   that   the
 circumstantial  case  is  correct.  Moscow  and  Baghdad worked together to
 create a large-scale deception in the Persian Gulf.


           Undoubtedly,  Western  intelligence  had some idea of Soviet
       involvement in the Gulf.  However,  their interpretation of  the
       connection  was  most  likely  misled.  Backed-up  by reassuring
       Soviet excuses,  Western analysts would downplay the  importance
       and implications of any Soviet involvement.  This is because the
       West would either have to accept that Saddam was a fool and they
       were winning or they were the fools and would end up losing in a
       most  tragic  way.  Western  arrogance  and fear would take over
       from there, something the Soviets could count on. (60)

                           -Part IV:  The Strategy-

           Why would Moscow have had Iraq stage the Gulf  War  and  its
       own  defeat?  Why would have Saddam Hussein gone along with such
       a humiliating plan?  Because the Gulf Crisis may have served  as
       an  important  deception  to  set  the  stage  for  a successful
       surprise attack by the East  against  the  West  and,  in  turn,
       totalitarian  domination  of the world.  Because Saddam Hussein,
       as a reward for his current sacrifices,  may eventually  receive
       the  power  to  're-create  the  glories  that  were Babylon and
       Mesopotamia' and then have  dominion  over  them.  By  accepting
       defeat  in the "Mother of All 'Battles'",  Saddam may have paved
       the way for totalitarianism to win the Mother of All 'Wars':

                                World War III.

     As a deception,  the Gulf Crisis would have served  important  military
 and political strategic aims of Moscow and its Eastern counterparts.

     In that it is not popularly perceived or expected,  Russia,  in concert
 with other military powers of the East,  may be pursuing a  grand  strategy
 for  world  domination  which involves launching a surprise third world war
 against the West (61).  The central idea of any such strategy would  be  to
 instill  a  false  sense  of  security  in the West.  Such a false sense of
 security will minimimize the West's military potential and maximize Western
 vulnerability.  This is true for two  main  reasons.  First  off,  with  no
 sense  of  a  threat,  the  West  will  reduce  its  military preparedness.
 Secondly, upon attack, the East would have the advantage of surprise- a key
 ingredient to success in a war involving rapid mass destruction.
     The principal way in which Moscow may be  trying  to  instill  a  false
 sense  of  security  in  the West is deceit.  By intentionally creating and
 exaggerating the image of weakness and incapacitation,  along with pursuing
 cooperative,  peace-oriented policies favorable to the West,  the perceived
 Soviet military threat has been virtually eliminated,  America has come  to
 trust its long-time Russian foe, and Western arrogance has been inflated to
 blinding proportions.  Consequently,  a tremendous, potentially false sense
 of  security  has  developed  in  the  West  entailing  a  high  degree  of
     If,  indeed,  the Gulf crisis was a deception,  then it was tailor-made
 for a strategy  as  outlined  above.  First  off,  by  creating  a  serious
 international  crisis  in  which  critical Western interests were at stake,
 Moscow gave itself the opportunity to cooperate with the West in  a  manner
 that seemed to reflect a progressive, peace-oriented change of heart.  This
 significantly fostered Western trust.  Secondly, since the West was allowed
 such  a substantial victory over Iraq,  and because Saddam's military state
 was of Soviet-design,  the West's sense of  superiority  to  the  East  was
 significantly  inflated  by  the  Gulf  War,  particularly  with respect to
 military capabilities (62).  Third,  since Moscow  turned  its  back  on  a
 valuable  military  ally  during the Gulf Crisis,  the image that Russia is
 incapacitated and  increasingly  interested  in  peaceful  coexistence  was
 reinforced and exagerrated.  Lastly,  on a broader level, the isolation and
 utter military defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq served as a symbolic end  to
 the power of military totalitarian regimes.
     A  provocative  example  of  how  Western  trust may have been directly
 exploited by the Soviets for successfully waging a surprise third world war
 can be seen in interrelated developments surrounding the  Gulf  Crisis  and
 the  Conventional  Forces  in  Europe  (CFE)  treaty.  In November of 1990,
 during the middle of the Gulf Crisis,  the United  States  signed  the  CFE
 treaty  with the Soviet Union.  The treaty entails major reductions in both
 sides' European theatre conventional forces into 1994.
     The CFE treaty is highly favorable to the Soviets  in  the  context  of
 their  initiating  a  third  world war with a preemptive,  nuclear surprise
 attack against the West.  The reason this is so has to  do  with  the  fact
 that  the  United  States  is  an  ocean  away from the European continent,
 whereas the Soviet Union is directly attached to  it.  Following  a  Soviet
 nuclear  attack,  America  would be unable to reinforce its European allies
 because the necessary ports,  airfields,  men and equipment will have  been
 destroyed.  Consequently,  it  would  be  relatively  easy  for  Russia  to
 reorganize the Soviet army and march across Western Europe (63).  Thus, the
 U.S.  force withdrawals under the CFE treaty may be benefitting Russia  if,
 indeed, a nuclear surprise attack is being planned.

     The Gulf Crisis sped-up and augmented the U.S.  pullout from Europe.  A
 substantial portion of the half-million  soldiers  and  military  equipment
 that  poured  into  Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War was pulled out of Western
 Europe (64).  For instance,  half  of  America's  mechanized  divisions  in
 Europe  were  drawn  into  the Gulf.  From Germany alone,  more than 70,000
 soldiers and 40,000 tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment were moved
 to Saudi Arabia  (65).  Following  the  Gulf  War,  with  superpower  trust
 elevated,  many  of  the  forces pulled from Western Europe returned to the
 U.S.  rather than the European theatre because it was to be removed by 1994
 under the terms of the CFE treaty anyways (66).
     The Gulf Crisis,  along with technicalities in the CFE treaty, was used
 by the Soviets to stockpile military equipment behind the  Ural  mountains-
 an important preparatory measure prior to waging a surprise attack- without
 alarming the West.  Just before signing the CFE agreement during the middle
 of  the  Gulf  Crisis,  the Soviets scurried over 70,000 pieces of military
 equipment east of the Ural mountains (according to  Moscow's  count)  (67).
 On  top  of  a  large  number of planes,  helicopters,  and armoured combat
 vehicles,  20,000 tanks and over 34,000 artillery pieces were  moved.  This
 accounts for half the tanks and two-thirds of the artillery the Soviets had
 prepositioned  against  Western  Europe  up  to  that  time.   Placing  the
 equipment behind the Urals protects it from being  counted  under  the  CFE
 treaty limits.  It also protects it from Western missile and/or air attacks
 and  puts  the  equipment  in  a  strategic position for later use in a re-
 conquest of Eastern Europe and offensive on Western Europe.  In a Februaury
 opposing-editorial to the Wall Street Journal,  the Deputy Director of  the
 Arms  Control  Association,  Jack Mendelsohn,  commented that:  "...placing
 these weapons in storage behind the Urals says  something  important  about
 Soviet  intentions  regarding  a  surprise attack or general war in Europe"
 (68).  NATO's supreme commander (retired:  6/92), General John Galvin,  had
 this  to  say  about  the stockpile:  "My concern is that this equipment is
 there for future use.  It's big, big numbers.  But I know it's just sitting
 there in the  snow-  tanks  and  airplanes  side  by  side,  sometimes  for
 kilometers  at  a  time"  (69).  For  the  most  part,  however,  the  West
 disregarded the provocative Soviet move.  Western suspicions were minimized
 due to growing superpower trust,  the distracting events in the  Gulf,  and
 the  idea  that  the Soviets may have simply been seeking to circumvent the
 CFE treaty.

     As can be readily surmised,  the general idea of the  Gulf  Crisis  and
 Moscow's  strategy  in  general  may involve seducing the West with lies in
 order to successfully wage a surprise third  world  war.  It  may  be  that
 Gorbachev  and  Saddam  are seeking to achieve long-run victory by allowing
 their own short-run defeats.  The West seems to have been easily seduced by
 what may prove to be the staged death of Eastern  military  totalitarianism
 and  an  illusory  global victory of Western society.  Such a lie is simply
 too tempting for indulgent,  proud Westerners to refuse.  As a  consequence
 of  this,  Western  vulnerability is at a post-war extreme and its military
 potential has been significantly compromised.  Thus, the path may have been
 opened for an all-out surprise attack from the East.


     Summarily,  there is substantial reason to believe the Gulf Crisis  was
 not  what it appeared to be.  In fact,  it may have been the total opposite
 of what it seemed- a total lie.  Instead of being  a  'great  victory',  as
 General Schwarzkopf believes,  the Gulf War may have been a deception which
 is being used toward the utter defeat of the West  and  global  victory  of
 Eastern totalitarianism.

     A   logical   explanation   for   the   pervasive  inconsistencies  and
 contradictions in Iraqi and Soviet behavior throughout the Gulf Crisis  and
 Gulf  War  is  that  the  whole  affair  may  have been some sort of staged
 deception.  It is possible that Saddam invaded Kuwait under  Kremlin  order
 with  the  sole intention of provoking a war with the West.  By cooperating
 with the West in an unprecedented manner,  the Soviets opened the  way  for
 the  Gulf War.  Once war came,  Saddam did what it took to decisively lose.
 The upshot is that Moscow and Baghdad underhandedly worked together to hand
 the West an illusory Gulf victory.
     The purpose behind such a deception would  likely  involve  an  overall
 Eastern  strategy  to  dominate  the  world by fighting and winning a third
 world war.  Saddam stomached a humiliating defeat in  order  to  augment  a
 false  sense  of security in the West and help Soviet Russia completely win
 over Western trust.  This,  in turn,  has opened the way for Moscow to dupe
 the West into lowering its guard, thus creating an opportunity for the East
 to launch a successful surprise attack.

     Due  in  large  part to the Gulf Crisis,  the world may today be on the
 brink of what would undoubtedly be the  the  Mother  of  All  Wars.  It  is
 rather  apparent  that  an  attack  from  the  East  would today be a total
 surprise.  Furthermore,  in the wake of its  Gulf  'victory',  America  has
 increasingly  let  down its military guard,  particularly against a Russian
 nuclear  attack.  {For  instance,  America's  strategic  command  has  been
 disbanded,  a  sizable part of the U.S.  ICBM arsenal has been deactivated,
 many attack-warning satellites and radar installations have been  shutdown,
 and almost all U.S.  tactical nuclear weapons abroad have been pulled home-
 including those which were on naval vessels (70).} All in all,  the  proper
 conditions  have  developed  for  the  East to launch a successful surprise
 attack against the West.  The Persian Gulf Crisis may have been a seductive
 lie which was created toward this ultimate End.

           "The harvest in the Mother of Battles  has  succeeded...
      the greater harvest and its yield will be in the time to come..."

              {comment by Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War}

        (Notes and References to this paper are in the next document.)

           *          *          *          *          *          *


                            -Outline of Epilogue-

     A.  Introduction
     B.  Another Persian Gulf Crisis
     C.  False Peace in the Middle East
     D.  The Balkans and the Caucasus
     E.  The (Open) Rise to Power of the Russian Right
     F.  Conclusion
     G.  References

           *          *          *          *          *          *

                           EPILOGUE: December, 1992


     Some  two  years  after  Iraq's  invasion  of  Kuwait,  Saddam  Hussein
 continues  to  provoke  the West.  In the wake of his seeming defeat in the
 Gulf war,  Saddam  has  repeatedly  violated  United  Nations'  resolutions
 against  Iraq and has pursued campaigns of brutal internal repression which
 have been internationally condemned.  His  provocations  have  brought  the
 world  to  the  brink  of  renewed  hostilities in the Persian Gulf several
 times, but fortunately Iraq keeps backing down.
     That Saddam continues to provoke the West is inconsistent  with  Iraq's
 best  interest  but  is  favorable  to Western interests.  By continuing to
 aggravate the United Nations and the Western powers, Saddam is reducing the
 chances for the international sanctions against Iraq to  be  lifted.  Also,
 he  is  making  it  virtually  impossible  for  Iraq  to  reenter the world
 community such that Iraqi political, economic,  and,  eventually,  military
 power  can be rebuilt.  Lastly,  Saddam's troublesome behavior has provided
 the West reason and support for renewing hostilities and  seeking  to  oust
 the Iraqi dictator from power.

     Saddam's  seemingly  irrational,  self-destructive behavior can be made
 sense of in the context of a grand strategy by  the  East  to  deceive  and
 defeat the West.

     In waging a third world war, the East would seek to win popular control
 of  the  world along side military control.  To do this,  the blame for war
 must  be  shifted  on  to  the  West.  This  is  because  whoever  is  held
 responsible  for  causing  the immense holocaust of world war three will be
 the focus of unprecedented popular hate.  Thus,  if it can be  staged  such
 that  global war appears to be the West's fault,  then people will support,
 rather than resist, an effort by the East to defeat the Western powers and,
 in turn, dominate the world.
     The exact set-up which could be used to frame the West likely  involves
 a future,  unprecedented international crisis or series of crises that will
 end in global war triggered from the Middle East.  The stage for  this  may
 currently be under development in the form of persistent Iraqi provocations
 against  the  West,  Arab/Israeli  peace  negotiations,  a  rising  tide of
 nationalism and ethnic warfare-particularly in Yugoslavia and the Caucuses,
 and increasing political turmoil in Russia.

                        -Another Persian Gulf Crisis-

     A logical explanation for Saddam's continuous and apparently irrational
 provocations is that he wants the West to resume hostilities and/or seek an
 overthrow of his dictatorship.

     On several occasions now Saddam has violated United Nations resolutions
 against Iraq and has brought forth serious confrontations with the  Western
 powers.  After  a  "No-Fly  Zone"  was  established  over  northern Iraq to
 protect Iraqi Kurds,  Iraq moved missiles and used radar to threaten allied
 flights.  After  an  ultimatum from the Western powers,  Saddam backed down
 and removed  the  missiles.  Last  July,  Iraq  refused  to  admit  weapons
 inspectors to its Ministry of Agriculture headquarters.  After the Security
 Council threatened to use force, Iraq allowed the inspectors in.  On top of
 these military confrontations,  Saddam has irritated the United Nations and
 the West by frustrating numerous  weapons  inspections,  failing  to  fully
 disclose  information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction,  apparently
 hiding SCUD missiles,  planting bombs on trucks carrying aid to the  Kurds,
 harassing United Nations officials working inside Iraq,  rejecting terms of
 U.N.-monitored oil sales intended to pay compensation  to  victims  of  the
 Kuwaiti  invasion,  and  boycotting  meetings  of  the Iraq-Kuwait boundary
 commision and rejecting some of  its  findings.  All  in  all,  Saddam  has
 persistently  antagonized the United Nations and the Western powers in ways
 which may eventually result in renewed hostilities.
     On top of provoking confrontations with the  United  Nations,  Saddam's
 antagonism has led the West to seek an overthrow of the Iraqi dictator.  By
 creating  militarily-enforced  'No-Fly  Zones',  the  West  has effectively
 partitioned Iraq into three separate states, thereby cornering Saddam:  the
 Kurd's have the North,  the Shiite's have the South,  and Saddam is trapped
 in the middle.  Besides cornering Saddam,  America and the  Western  allies
 have  helped  organize,  and  have pledged support for,  forces inside Iraq
 seeking to oust Saddam Hussein from  power.  For  instance,  the  West  has
 backed  the development of the 'Iraqi National Congress',  a conglomeration
 of various groups inside Iraq that are opposed to Saddam.  The Congress  is
 currently  seeking  to  replace  the government in Baghdad by instigating a
 popular internal uprising and/or military  coup  against  Saddam  Hussein's
     The  reason  Saddam  wants  the  West to resume fighting and/or try and
 overthrow his regime would most likely have to do with  preparing  the  way
 for  Iraq to trigger war in the Middle East.  By provoking Western military
 intervention and/or  staging  an  overthrow  attempt,  Saddam  creates  the
 perfect  excuse for taking seemingly last-resort,  kamikazee action against
 Israel and the West.  This would likely involve,  at the least,  a chemical
 SCUD  attack against Israel {which would 'make fire eat up half of Israel',
 just as Saddam had threatened to do a few months prior to  invading  Kuwait
 (1)}.  Because  such an attack on Israel would stem from apparently blatant
 Western aggression against Saddam's Iraq,  the 'imperialist' West  will  be
 held responsible for the ultimate consequences.

                       -False Peace in the Middle East-

     In  the  context  of a grand strategy by the East to deceive and defeat
 the West,  the current Arab/Israeli peace  talks  should  be  considered  a
 strategic  deception.  The purpose of such a deception would likely be two-
 fold:  1.) to set the stage for a 'surprise' Arab/Israeli war,  and 2.)  to
 insure world war three is blamed on the West rather than the East.
     There are numerous indications that the Arabs intend to make war rather
 than peace.  First off,  the proposals for comprehensive peace recently put
 forth by Syria and Jordan,  two of Israel's  most  steadfast  enemies,  are
 simply  too  unprecedented  and  historically  inconsistent.  They  utterly
 contradict the long-time stated intentions of Arab leaders,  such as  Hafez
 Assad  of Syria,  to annihilate the Jewish state.  They also contradict the
 decades of extraordinary military investments made by  the  Arabs  to  make
 good  on their stated intentions.  Recent evidence that the peace talks are
 a lie comes from Syria's continuing support for terrorist  attacks  against
 Israelis  in  Northern  Israel  and  Southern Lebanon.  Furthermore,  Syria
 continues to buy increasingly sophisticated long-range SCUD missiles  which
 can  be  used for chemical attacks on Israel,  and,  on top of that,  Hafez
 Assad recently signed a 'weapons cooperation accord' with Russia  according
 to  which  Syria  will  receive  billions of dollars worth of sophisticated
 Sukhoi and MiG fighter jets along with top-of-the-line  Russian  tanks  and
 anti-missile systems (2).  If, indeed, Syria were committed to peace rather
 than war, such activity would have ended long ago.
     If  the  peace  negotiations are deceptive,  then the ultimate aim most
 likely involves some form of future Arab surprise  attack.  The  Arabs  may
 very well be planning to reach a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel,
 but  only  to  secure the element of surprise and to get Israel to drop its
 guard.  Specifically,  one important military/strategic aim of an agreement
 might  be  an  Israeli pullout from the Golan Heights- a mountainous buffer
 zone which currently blocks a Syrian breakthrough.  Such a  pullout,  along
 side  an  Israeli  false sense of security,  would make the Jewish state as
 vulnerable as possible to an Arab attack.

     To make sure that the East is not blamed for world war three, the Arabs
 would want to launch an attack against Israel in a way that appears  to  be
 provoked by the West and Israel itself.
     To  start  with,  current  Arab  peace  efforts,  along side increasing
 violence in Southern Lebanon,  may be paving the way for the East to  shift
 blame  on  to  the West for a future Arab/Israeli war.  As the Arabs pursue
 peace,   they  increasingly  appear  to  be  peace-oriented   rather   than
 belligerent.  Meanwhile,  Israel  appears  to  be  increasingly belligerent
 rather than peaceful because stepped-up  terrorist  attacks  have  provoked
 Israeli raids against terrorist factions in Southern Lebanon.  By linking a
 future  war  to  Israeli  action in Lebanon,  the Arabs could significantly
 reverse any blame.
     As is mentioned above,  besides Lebanon,  war could be set-off  in  the
 Middle  East  in a way that appears to be the West's fault by having Saddam
 provoke a crisis with the West and then launch a kamikazee  attack  against
 Israel.  Following  an  Iraqi  chemical attack against the Jewish state- an
 action which would revive memories of Hitler's gassing of the Jews- Israeli
 retaliation  will  be  both  assured  and  severe  (3).  Israel's  military
 response  could,  in  turn,  be used by the Arabs- particularly Syria- as a
 pretense for war that, due to the current peace efforts,  would effectively
 be a surprise.

     All  in all,  by using Iraq,  and possibly Lebanon,  to spawn a primary
 crisis,  the Arabs could launch an attack against Israel and have it appear
 to be the West's and Israel's fault.

     In  the context of a general strategy involving Russia,  the goal of an
 Arab attack against Israel would be its predictable consequence: to get the
 West to use nuclear weapons first.  It is widely recognized that Israel has
 a substantial nuclear arsenal which  includes  nuclear  missiles.  Upon  an
 Arab breakthrough, it is believed that Israel would launch a nuclear attack
 against  its perceived enemies (4).  This,  in turn,  would give Russia the
 excuse it needs to launch a nuclear attack against the  West  and  have  it
 appear  to  be  'retaliation'.  Thus,  because Israel would be quick to use
 nuclear weapons,  Russia may be planning to use a surprise Arab/Israeli war
 as a catalyst for surprise nuclear attack against the West.

        (It  should be noted that a 'surprise' attack entails any attack
     that is unexpected.  In the context of today's apparent 'New  World
     Order'  involving East/West and Arab/Israeli peace and cooperation,
     both an Arab/Israeli war and/or a global  East/West  war  would  be
     unexpected  and effectively a surprise at present regardless of the
     crisis or crises that may serve as a pretense for war.)

                        -The Balkans and the Caucasus-

     Besides the Middle East,  it appears that Moscow  may  use  the  Balkan
 and/or Caucasian regions as flash-points for world war three.

     On a general level,  disintegrating the Soviet Union has opened the way
 for a rising tide of nationalism  and  ethnic  warfare.  What's  more,  the
 perception  of  a  debilitated and militarily weak Russia opens the way for
 strong Western military intervention the world over.
     By fostering nationalist trends and ethnic conflicts  in  the  Balkans-
 principally  Yugoslavia-  and  Caucasian  countries-  such  as  Armenia and
 Azerbaijan,  Russia may be seeking to provoke Western military intervention
 that can be linked to the outbreak of world war three.  In this way,  blame
 for global war can be shifted as much as possible on to West.
     The focus on these regions would likely have to do  with  the  ease  of
 pulling  the local NATO members into large-scale war.  Both the Yugoslavian
 and Armenian/Azerbaijan conflicts currently underway can be escalated  such
 that  regional  war will breakout involving,  at the least,  Turkey- NATO's
 critical East-West linchpin.  This can easily be used  as  a  pretense  for
 general war between the East and West.
     That  Moscow  is  planning  to use the Balkan and Caucasian regions for
 flashpoints is indicated by inconsistent policies  and  the  statements  of
 Russian officials.  With regard to Yugoslavia, even though Moscow signed an
 agreement  for an international embargo on arms shipments to Serbia,  it is
 still supplying large quantities of arms to its ex-ally (5) (Serbia is  the
 principal  belligerent  in  the  Yugoslavian  war).   Furthermore,   Sergey
 Yastrzhemskiy,  director  of  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,
 recently  warned  that the situation in the Balkans could lead "to a global
 explosion fraught with the danger  of  a  third  world  war"  (6).  In  the
 Caucasus,    Moscow's    calls   for   a   diplomatic   solution   to   the
 Armenian/Azerbaijan conflict has been contradicted by policies  which  have
 armed the local populations.  Also, last May, General Yevgeny Shaposhnikov,
 commander of the CIS (ex-Soviet) army,  warned that foreign intervention in
 the region "could bring the world into  the  third  world  war"  (7).  More
 specifically, the mutual security arrangements of the CIS are arranged such
 that,  should  Turkey  intervene  in  Armenia-  something  which Turkey has
 threatened to do on several occasions,  the CIS would be  pulled  into  war
 against Turkey and, in turn, NATO.

               -The (Open) Rise to Power of the Russian Right-

     Along side underhandedly creating war in and around the Middle East, it
 would  be  strategic for Moscow to instigate political turmoil and possibly
 civil war in Russia before launching an all-out attack.  From  such  chaos,
 Moscow  could  stage  an  open  rise to power by Russian neo-facists,  more
 commonly referred to as the "Russian Right".

     If,  indeed, the East has been pursuing a grand deception over the past
 several years,  then it is likely that Gorbachev's rise to  power  in  1985
 entailed  a  dramatic  ideological shift to the political right rather than
 the left.  At first this may seem hard to believe, but, indeed,  going into
 the  1980's,  it  was  well-recognized that a shift to the right was taking
 place at the top in the Soviet Union {for instance, see: Alexander Yanov's,
 'The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000' (8)}.
     The Russian Right is the  ultimate  form  of  facism.  It  is  centered
 around an ideology that paints Jews  and  Westerners  as  satanic  elements
 conspiring  to  overtake Russia and the world.  Consequently,  Russia has a
 messianic calling to wage a merciless  war  against  Israel  and  the  West
 before   the   world   is   completely   controlled   by   evil   "zionist"
 (Israeli/Jewish)  and  "freemasonry"  (Western/liberal-democratic)   forces
 (purportedly  by  the year 2000).  Through this war Russia will fulfill its
 destiny of saving (dominating) the world and establishing a global  kingdom
 of  god  (dictatorship  of man).  The pseudo-Christian underpinnings of the
 Russian Right brought about a strong alliance between Rightist elements  in
 the government and leaders in the Russian Orthodox Church.  In other words,
 with the emergence of the Russian Right,  the ideology surrounding Russia's
 historical messianic complex shifted from Communism to Orthodoxy. (9)
     There were numerous indications that Gorbachev led a rise to  power  by
 the  Russian  Right.  First  off,  Gorbachev's  background in the Komsomols
 (Young Communists) involved participation in anti-semitic activities  under
 Stalin  (10).  It was these anti-semitic programs which were the roots from
 which the Russian  Right  emerged  {especially  in  the  context  of  Young
 Guardism  (11)}.  Since Gorbachev eventually became a leading figure in the
 Komsomols,  there is reason to believe he was involved in the emergence  of
 the  Russian Right (12).  His remarkably fast rise into the Politburo under
 Brezhnev (Gorbachev was only 50 when he entered the Politburo  whereas  the
 average  age of a member was over 70) indicates he was tied to an extremely
 powerful movement which,  at that time,  would have most  likely  been  the
 Right.  During  the 1970's,  the Russian Right was seeking to bring about a
 top-down  revolution.  By  achieving  power  at  the  top,  the  neo-facist
 ideology  of the Russian Right could be spread downward to the people (13).
 This is exactly what happened under Gorbachev.
     Soon after  Gorbachev  came  to  power  and  initiated  his  policy  of
 Glasnost, or openess, the neo-facist ideology of the Russian Right began to
 be   introduced   to   the  Russian  people  through  supposedly  grassroot
 organizations which were,  in  fact,  created  and  financed  by  the  KGB.
 Probably the ultimate example of this is an organization called 'Pamyat'.
     Pamyat  was  underhandedly created by the Soviet government and the KGB
 supposedly  as  an  independent  organization  devoted  to  renovating  and
 restoring  Russian  monuments,  museums,  historical  sights,  and Orthodox
 Churches (14).  Quickly,  however,  it transformed into a leading front for
 the  spread  of  Russian  neo-facism.   Pamyat  and  its  activities  under
 Gorbachev could be tied to the  KGB,  high-level  elements  of  the  Soviet
 military,  and  the  Central  Committee  of the Central Party of the Soviet
 Union  (CPSU).  In  fact,  there  were  indications  that  Yegor  Ligachev,
 Gorbachev's  right-hand  man,  and  Raisa Gorbachev,  Mikhail's wife,  were
 directly involved with  Pamyat  (15).  Furthermore,  in  1987,  Gorbachev's
 closest  Politburo ally,  Boris Yeltsin (!),  held an extraordinary meeting
 with Pamyat leaders (16).  Following this meeting Pamyat was  permitted  to
 use   government   buildings   for   meetings   and  other  activities-  an
 unprecedented privilege.  Further indicating  Pamyat's  connection  to  the
 government,  at  the  1990 Revolution Day parade in Moscow's Red Square the
 military and police kept all groups of demonstrators at least a  mile  away
 from the parade  area  except  for  Pamyat  (17).  Furthermore,  that  year
 Gorbachev  appointed  two  people to his 13-member presidential council who
 were believed to be members of  Pamyat  (18).  One  of  those  individuals,
 Valentin   Rasputin,   advocated  that  Russian  Jews  ought  to  be  tried
 collectively for the murder of Jesus (19).
     The  linkage  between  Pamyat  and the Soviet power structure indicates
 that the Russian Right came to power with the rise  of  Mikhail  Gorbachev,
 but  an  open  rise  to  power by Russian neo-facism and an apocalyptic war
 launched against the  West  will  likely  be  carried  out  by  a  Vladimir
 Zhirinovsky.  Vladimir  Zhirinovsky  is  the leader of a party misleadingly
 called the Liberal Democratic Party.  He was recently quoted as saying:  "I
 am  the  Almighty.  I am the tyrant.  I will follow in Hitler's footsteps."
 (20)  His  purported  goals  are  the  same  as  Pamyat's,   including  the
 restoration of the Byzantine empire of the East.
     Zhirinovsky  is  evidently  an  agent  of  the  KGB.  A  recent outside
 investigation of the 1990 August coup in Moscow has uncovered documents and
 evidence which establishes direct links between Zhirinovsky,  the KGB,  and
 the  CPSU  under Gorbachev (21).  Furthermore,  the evidence indicates that
 the Liberal Democratic Party effectively does not exist.  Since Zhirinovsky
 supposedly received six million votes and came  in  third  in  the  Russian
 presidential  elections  won  by  Yeltsin,  the  indication  is  that those
 elections were,  in fact,  a fraud (22).  Overall,  the indication is  that
 Zhirinovsky   is   KGB  and  Gorbachev  and  Yeltsin  are  involved  in  an
 unprecedented, global-scale deception.
     It appears that Zhirinovsky was created to carry out the dirty work  of
 the  Russian  Right.  He  could  prove to be the key player in launching an
 all-out Russian attack against the West.  To understand how and why this is
 so one must first consider the 1991 August coup in Moscow.
     There is good reason to believe that the  August  coup  in  the  Soviet
 Union  was  a  staged deception.  To understand why,  simply consider that,
 during a 'hardline' coup in the  largest  military  dictatorship  in  world
 history,  it  would  be  unlikely  that the supposed main opposition- Boris
 Yelstin and his counterparts-  would  go  unarrested  or  unkilled.  It  is
 outright  absurd to believe that this opposition could get away with making
 speeches and rallying popular support to undo the coup in  the  streets  of
 Moscow.   Yet,  this  is  supposedly  what  happened  (23).  Realistically,
 however,  the main opposition would be the first thing to go in a  hardline
 coup  involving  the  strategically-minded KGB and Soviet military.  All in
 all,  the August coup may have been nothing but  a  deception  and  Mikhail
 Gorbachev,  Boris Yelstin,  and the rest of the 'ex-communist', 'ex-Soviet'
 leadership,  have always been and will likely always be 'hardliners'  whose
 intent is world domination.
     The  1991  coup  had  a notable peculiarity which may portend a future,
 bogus coup which Moscow may be planning to  stage  prior  to  launching  an
 attack  against  the  West.  Following  the  August coup,  the Soviet press
 emphasized how Gorbachev's 'briefcase' fell into the hands of the  supposed
 hardliners who threw the coup.  This briefcase reportedly carried the codes
 which  are  used  to  launch the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles.  In other
 words,  it was made clear to the world how the coup could  have  led  to  a
 nuclear war launched by radical hardliners. (24)
     Prior to launching a third world war,  it would be strategic for Moscow
 to stage a rise to power by the Russian  Right.  First  off,  such  a  move
 would  be  necessary  to maintain the consistency of the overall deception.
 Yeltsin's Russia,  like Gorbachev's  Soviet  Union,  has  been  painted  as
 progressive  and  peace-oriented.  Thus,  prior to launching a war,  Russia
 would want it to appear that radical hardliners are in power.  This way the
 world won't pick-up on the overall deception that's been  underway  or  the
 premeditated nature of Russia's attack.
     By  maintaining the overall deception,  Russia's 'true' leaders will be
 able to sidestep blame and, more importantly, they'll eventually be able to
 achieve popular world control.  Following an all-out offensive against  the
 West  and  military  campaign  to dominate the world,  Russia would want to
 stage a bogus  'return'  to  power  by  what  have  been  made  out  to  be
 progressive,  peace-oriented  leaders-  especially Mikhail Gorbachev.  This
 way military control of the world can be  reinforced  by  popular  control.
 Instead  of realizing how Gorbachev and his associates were responsible for
 world destruction,  people will believe these leaders saved the world  from
 ultimate destruction by Russian extremists.
     It  seems  clear  that  Vladimir  Zhirinovsky is the openly neo-facist,
 hardline leader that Moscow is planning to bring  to  power  for  launching
 world  war  three.  The  stage  is  being  set  so  that  his rise to power
 parallels Hitler's rise to power in the Weimar Republic of  Germany  during
 the  1930's.  Over  the  past couple of years,  Russia has been transformed
 into a what's  supposed  to  be  a  fledgling  democratic  nation  with  no
 democratic  heritage  suffering  from  increasing  political  and  economic
 disintegration.  This,  of course,  was what the Weimar Republic of Germany
 was like.  Now,  a neo-facist dictator, Vladmir Zhirinovsky, can be carried
 to power out of popular frustrations.  This,  of  course,  was  how  Hitler
 found  his  way  to  the  top.  Once  Zhirinovsky's is supposedly placed in
 charge,  possibly through some sort of bogus palace  coup  against  Yeltsin
 (keep in mind it is all staged and Gorbachev,  Yeltsin, and the powers that
 be are simply engaging in large-scale political deception),  he then can be
 used to launch a world war; again, 'following in Hitler's footsteps'.
     The  reason  that  Moscow  would stage a shift to the right in a manner
 which parallels the rise of facism in Germany during the 1930's is that  it
 makes the overall deception more believable.  Nevertheless, the connections
 between  Gorbachev,  Yeltsin,  and  the  Russian  Right,  as  well  as  the
 connections between Zhirinovsky, the KGB, and the CPSU as it were,  make it
 clear  that  neo-facism found its way into the Russian power structure long
 ago.  What's taking place at present and what occurs in the future has been
 preplanned and is bogus.
     That  an  open  rise  to  power  by  the  extreme  right  and  Vladimir
 Zhirinovsky will be used to make way for an all-out war against the West is
 made clear by the super-belligerent threats Zhirinovsky  has  been  making.
 First  off,  Zhirinovsky is calling for the forceful reestablishment of the
 pre-1917 borders of the Czarist Russian empire.  Furthermore,  he has vowed
 to wage a third world war against the West in Yugoslavia, the Caucuses, and
 the Middle East.  Lastly,  and most importantly,  Zhirinovsky recently made
 his  first  international  diplomatic  trip.  He  went  to  Baghdad,  Iraq.
 Zhirinovsky  has  pledged  to  support Saddam Hussein in waging war against
 Russia's and Iraq's common enemies of the West,  Israel,  and Turkey.  What
 is more, Zhirinovsky has stated that he will not hesitate to use weapons of
 mass destruction in that effort. (25)


     All  in  all,  by  underhandedly provoking war in and around the Middle
 East along side staging a radical power  shift  to  the  extreme  right  in
 Russia,  Moscow creates the ideal scenario for fighting and winning a third
 world  war  against  the  West.  By  instigating  the  collapse  of  Soviet
 Communism and pursuing world peace over the past several years,  Moscow has
 secured surprise and duped the West into dropping its guard.  This has also
 made it possible to frame the Western powers  such  that  world  war  three
 appears  to  be  their fault.  Lastly,  the way has been opened for Russian
 Orthodoxy  to  replace  Communism.   Now  with  the  West  vulnerable   but
 aggressive,  Moscow can underhandedly provoke Western military intervention
 at various flashpoints of a third world war.  Principally,  the West can be
 pulled into conflict in the Persian Gulf (Iraq),  the Balkans (Yugoslavia),
 the Caucuses (Armenia/Azerbaijan),  and  the  Middle  East  (Arab/Israeli).
 Meanwhile,  an open rise to power by Russian neo-facists can be staged such
 that Moscow can launch its attack without exposing the  overall  deception.
 Suddenly  faced  by  the  militant  dictator Vladimir Zhirinovsky,  Western
 military action in and around the Middle East can be used as an excuse  for
 all-out war, including a massive nuclear strike against the West- likely in
 response  to  a  last-ditch  Israeli nuclear attack during an Arab overrun.
 After the dust settles,  the West will have been utterly  defeated  by  the
 East from an attack which came as a complete surprise.  What is worse,  the
 horrific war will be blamed on the imperialistic efforts of the West rather
 than the guilty East.  The stage will  be  set  for  Mikhail  Gorbachev  to
 'reemerge'  to  power in Russia.  Orthodoxy can be established in the place
 of Communism and Gorbachev can declare himself world savior.  Thus,  Russia
 will have achieved both military and popular dominance of the world.
     As for Saddam Hussein,  the reason for his seemingly irrational,  self-
 sacrificial  actions  thus  far  would  finally  become clear.  Through his
 cooperation with Moscow,  Saddam may eventually achieve both  military  and
 popular  dominance  in the Moslem world.  If events generally proceed as is
 spelled out above, then, after the dust settles,  Saddam would emerge as an
 ultimate hero of the Arab and Moslem people.  Just as it appeared to be all
 over  for him,  Saddam managed to completely turn circumstances around such
 that utter defeat was brought to his 'imperialist'  enemies  of  the  West:
 Israel,  America,  and  the  Western allies.  Thus,  Saddam will be able to
 establish popular dominion over  Persia  and  possibly  the  entire  Moslem
 world.  Saddam's  power  will likely be reinforced by his central role in a
 Russian/Moslem military alliance to be 'openly' forged later on.

                *          *          *          *          *


 1.  "A Slow Slide Toward War". 'Newsweek': 7/2/90; 28.

 2.  "Major  Russia-Syria  Arms  Sale  Reported".  'The  Washington  Times':
     11/3/92; A2.

 3.  "U.N.  Team Looking for SCUD Missiles  that  may  be  Hidden".  'Agence
     France Presse': 10/18/92.

 4.  Hersch,  Seymour.  'The  Samson  Option:  Israel's  Nucler  Arsenal and
     American Foreign Policy'.  Randome House; New York, NY: 1991.

 5.  "Washington Whispers". 'U.S. News and World Report': 8/10/92; 18.

 6.  "Foreign Ministry Briefing Covers  Yugoslavia,  Estonia  and  Lebanon".
     'BBC Summary of World Broadcasts': 6/9/92.

 7.  "The Question of Azerbaijan; Nationalism Unleashed - I".  'The Nation':
     9/14/92; 241.

 8.  Yanov,  Alexander.  'The Russian Challenge and the  Year  2000'.  Basil
     Blackwell; New York, NY: 1987.

 9.  See (8).

 10.  "Moscow's  Gorbachev:  A  New  Leader  in  the  Old  Mold".  'Heritage
      Foundation Reports': 8/29/85.

 11.  See (8).

 12.  "The Rise and Fall of Gorbachev". 'Los Angeles Times': 12/26/91; A1.

 13.  To the Russian Right this top-down revolution is  in  the  context  of
      "The Great Transformation".  See (8).

 14.  Bortin,  Mary  Ellen.  "Russian Heritage Group Said to Fan Nationalist
      Hysteria". 'Reuters': 6/2/87.

 15.  Simes, Dimitri.  "Extremists Flourish in Gorbachev Era".  'Los Angeles
      Times': 6/25/87; part 2/p5.

 16.  "Russian Nationalism Spreads; Moscow Group Holds Public Protest". 'The
      Washington Post': 5/24/87; A25.

 17.  "Prizewinner's Ways". 'Forbes': 1/7/91; 10.

 18.  "Gorbachev  Appeases  Hard-liners,  Names 2 Russians to Inner Circle".
      'The Washington Times': 4/26/90; A11.

 19.  "Yeshiva University Should've Known  Better".  'The  Jerusalem  Post':

 20.  "Russia: Hardline Communists Take Road to Facism".  'The Independent':
      12/1/92; 11.

 21.  "Accusations by the  White  House".  'Current  Digest  of  the  Soviet
      Press': 1/29/92; 23.

 22.  "Communist Losers Offer Excuses for Russian Poll Defeat". 'The Times':

 23.  For a comprehensive review of events during the 1991  August  coup  in
      Moscow,  see:  "Three Days That Shook the World".  'U.S.  News & World
      Report': 11/8/91; 52.

 24.  "Where's was the Black Box?". 'Time': 9/2/91; 43.

 25.  "In Russia, It's Us vs.  Them;  Nationalists Preach Hate, Militarism".
      'Newsday': 12/29/92; 12.
                       ***THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION***

                             -Notes & References-

                      "The great masses of the people...
      will more easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one."

                               (Adolph Hitler)

                       From:  'Mein Kampf', Chapter 10.

         "We have no right ever to forget that psychological warfare
                  is a struggle for winning people's minds."

                             (Mikhail Gorbachev)

                     From:  "Soviet Disinformation Chief:
                A Master at Using Words as  Cold-War Weapons",
                       'The New York Tribune': 7/27/87.


 1.  General Schwarzkopf made this comment while  answering  questions  from
     the press following the Gulf War.

 2.  This  idea is covered in depth in another paper I wrote entitled:  "The
     Total Lie".

     The main purpose of a grand deception would be to set the stage  for  a
     Russian  nuclear  surprise  attack.  To  understand  how this could be,
     simply consider the following three points:

     I)   The seeming collapse of Soviet  communism  has  almost  completely
          undone  Western expectations of a preemptive nuclear attack.  This
          entails that:

          a) Russia can currently launch  the  10,000+  nuclear  weapons  it
             still has targetted against America and its allies, and it will
             be  a complete surprise.  In other words,  because we no longer
             expect it, Russia can now launch a 'surprise' attack.

             That this is what Moscow has been planning the whole time would
             explain why military spending went up under Gorbachev in  stark
             contradiction   to  the  supposedly  peace-oriented  change  in
             Moscow's foreign policy (i).  It would  also  explain  why  the
             Soviets   concentrated   on  expanding  and  modernizing  their
             strategic nuclear forces over the past seven years while at the
             same time forging and signing agreements with the West  to  get
             rid of such weapons (ii).

          b) Since  it  is  not  expected,   America  and  its  allies  have
             increasingly dropped their guard against a nuclear attack, thus
             the West is now most vulnerable to one (see note 70).

     II)  The  disintegration  of  the  Soviet empire not only has minimized
          Western perceptions of the Soviet military threat,  it has reduced
          Soviet  vulnerability  to Western nuclear retaliation.  By letting
          go  of  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Republics,  Moscow  has
          constrained  its  vulnerable  targets  to  Mother  Russia.   Thus,
          roughly two-thirds of its previous empire is now safe from Western
          nuclear retaliation following a Russian  attack-  and  that's  not
          counting unconnected puppet states like Cuba (iii).

          The  idea that the breakup of the Soviet empire was intentional is
          substantiated by reports that  the  KGB  instigated,  rather  than
          sought  to repress,  the popular uprisings in,  at the least,  the
          Eastern European states (iv).  Furthermore,  it explains  why  the
          Soviets  never used military force to restore order and control in
          their empire as had been done throughout the  previous  70  years.
          Lastly,  an  intentional  breakup  would explain what interest the
          Communist Party had in voting itself out of existence.

     III) A major element of the Soviet Union's seeming demise has  been  an
          economic  collapse  and  increasingly  severe  food  crisis.   The
          failure of the Soviet economy has been rather  peculiar,  however,
          in  that,   as  production  and  employment  remained  high,   the
          availability of  goods  for  consumers  dwindled.  This  has  been
          attributed   to   failures  in  the  Soviet  distribution  system.
          However,  that goods have been produced but not consumed indicates
          that  a  large  surplus  is  being  lost somewhere.  While Western
          analysts have concluded that there has been a tremendous amount of
          waste,  in the context of a  Soviet  grand  deception  to  wage  a
          surprise  nuclear  war,  it would make sense that the Soviets have
          been using an economic crisis as a cover for mass stockpiling.

          This would be consistent with how Moscow  has  spent  hundreds  of
          billions  of  dollars on elaborate and comprehensive civil defense
          programs which have rivalled Soviet  strategic  arms  programs  in
          both cost and scale (v).  It would also explain why shortages have
          persisted  even  though many food warehouses throughout Russia are
          full- partially due to generous Western aid (vi).  Lastly, such an
          economic deception would explain why  Western  intelligence  found
          that  Soviet  officials  began  systematically  'under'-estimating
          economic output and potential after Gorbachev came to power (vii).

          i.   Specifically,  Soviet defense  expenditures  increased  by  3
               percent per year in real terms under Gorbachev.  See:

               'Soviet   Military   Power'.   US   Department   of  Defense;
               Washington, DC: (esp. 1989).

          ii.  See, for instance:

               Cline,  Ray  (ed).  'Behind the Smile Are Teeth of Iron'.  US
               Global Strategy Council; Washington, DC: 1989.

          iii. In  terms of population and economic potential.  Regarding US
               and NATO retargetting activities, see:

               Kruzel, Joseph. '1991-92 American Defense Annual'.  Lexington
               Books; Lexington, MA: 1992; 76-77.

          iv.  Leonard, Paul. "Countdown to Destruction". 'Fatima Crusader':
               10-11/90; 14.

          v.   See, for instance:

               'Soviet Military Power': 1988.

               Broder,   John.   "Underground   Shelters  Built  for  Soviet
               Leaders". 'Los Angeles Times': 4/30/88: I,16.

          vi.  See, for instance:

               Parks,  Michael.  "Food Shipments Trapped in  Web  of  Soviet
               Inefficiency". 'Los Angeles Times': 12/11/90; A6.

               Blitz,  James.  "Hunger in the Heart of Plenty".  'The Sunday
               Times': 12/9/90.

          vii. Epstein,  Edward.  'Deception:  The Invisible War Between the
               KGB and the CIA'.  Simon and Schuster;  New York,  NY:  1989;

     For an overview of Soviet strategy for surprise nuclear war, see:

     Douglass,  Joseph D.,  Jr.  'Soviet Strategy for Nuclear  War'.  Hoover
     Institute Press; Stanford, CA: 1979.

     Van Cleave, Dr.  William R. "Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces and Goals:
     Deception  and  Surprise".  From:  'Mesmerized  By  The  Bear' Sleeper,
     Raymond (ed).  Dodd, Mead, & Co.  New York, NY: 1987; 89-109.

     For an overall idea of how and why the military powers of the East- led
     by Soviet Russia- may be pursuing  a  grand  strategy  to  deceive  and
     militarily conquer the West, see:

     Beichman,  Arnold.  'The  Long  Pretense:  Soviet Treaty Diplomacy from
     Lenin to Gorbachev'.  Transaction Publishers; New Brunswick, NJ: 1991.

     Cline,  Ray (ed).  'Behind the Smile Are  Teeth  of  Iron'.  US  Global
     Strategy Council; Washington, DC: 1989.

     Daily,  Brian  and Patrick Parker (eds).  'Soviet Strategic Deception'.
     Lexington Books; Lexingtion, MA: 1987.

     Douglass,  Joseph D.,  Jr.  'Soviet Strategy for Nuclear  War'.  Hoover
     Institute Press; Stanford, CA: 1979.

     Epstein, Edward Jay. 'Deception: The Secret War Between the KGB and the
     CIA'.  Simon & Schuster; New York, NY: 1989.

     Golitsyn,  Anatoliy.  'New  Lies  for  Old:  The  Communist Strategy of
     Deception and Disinformation'. Dodd, Mead; New York, NY: 1984.

     Kintner, William.  'Soviet Global Strategy'.  Hero Books;  Fairfax, VA:

     Kintner,  William  and Harriet Scott (eds).  'The Nuclear Revolution in
     Soviet Military Affairs'.  University of Oklahoma  Press;  Norman,  OK:

     Sleeper,  Raymond (ed).  'Mesmerized By The Bear'.  Dodd,  Mead,  & Co.
     New York, NY: 1987.

 3.  "A Slow Slide Toward War". 'Newsweek': 7/2/90; 29.

 4.  Information  compiled  from  various  news  sources.   For  a  thorough
     analysis of Saddam's military going into the Gulf War, see:

     Darwish,  Adel and Gregory Alexander.  'Unholy Babylon'.  St.  Martin's
     Press.  New York, NY: 1991; 85-178.

 5.  Kondracke, Morton. "Saddamnation". 'The New Republic': 5/7/90; 10-11.

 6.  "The Guns of August". 'The New Republic': 9/3/90; 9.

 7.  "A Slow Slide Toward War".

 8.  Kondracke; 10.

 9.  Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris.  'Saddam's War'.  Faber & Faber,  Inc.
     Winchester, MA: 1991; 1-2.

 10.  Bulloch and Morris; 102.

 11.  Bulloch and Morris- also see:

      "Standing up to Saddam Hussein". 'Economist': 7/28/90; 11-12.

 12.  Kruzel,  Joseph  (ed).  '1991-92  American Defense Annual'.  Lexington
      Books; Lexington, MA: 1992; 1.

 13.  "The Guns of August".

 14.  For a synopsis of Resolution 660, see: Darwish and Alexander; 308.

 15.  For a thorough "Diary of the Gulf Crisis", see: Darwish and Alexander;

 16.  Bulloch and Morris; 5.

 17.  Darwish and Alexander; 299-307.

 18.  Kruzel; 107.

 19.  Kruzel; 1.

 20.  "US Says Early Air Attack Caught Iraq Off Guard".  'New  York  Times'.
      1/18/91; A10.

 21.  Grier,   Peter.   "Iraq's  Chemical  Weapons  Found  to  be   Potent".
      'Christian Science Monitor': 1/23/92; 1.

      Also  from  Associated  Press  (AP)  reports  taken off Dow Jones News
      Retrieval on April 19, 1991.

 22.  For a thorough examination of Iraqi development and usage of  chemical
      weapons, see: Darwish and Alexander; 101-114.

 23.  Grier; 1.

 24.  Darwish and Alexander; 112.

 25.  "The Fury of Desert Storm". 'U.S. News & World Report': 3/11/91; 74.

 26.  Tyler, Patrick E.  "Iraq's War Toll Estimated by U.S.;  100,000 Killed
      and 300,000 hurt in Persian Gulf cited  as  tentative  figures".  'New
      York Times': 6/5/91; A5.

 27.  "The 100-Hour War". 'U.S. News & World Report': 3/11/91; 16.

 28.  "The 100-Hour War".

 29.  "U.N.  Survey  Calls  Iraq's  War Damage Near-Apocalyptic".  'New York
      Times': 3/22/91; A1.

 30.  "The 100-Hour War".

 31.  "Intelligence  in  a  World  of  Change  (Satellites   and   Humans)".
      'Government Executive' (serial):  National Journal, Inc.;  Washington,
      DC: 3/92.

 32.  For a thorough examination of Iraq's nuclear program, see: Darwish and
      Alexander; 178-196.

 33.  Widely reported in the summer of 1991.

      Meisler, Stanley.  "300 Iraq SCUDs Missing, U.N.  Team Reports".  'Los
      Angeles Times': 11/2/91; A10.

      (also from CNN news reports)

 34.  Epstein,  Edward  Jay.  "Virtual  Ally:  What's the Soviet Game in the
      Gulf?". 'The New Republic': 9/3/90; 19-20.

 35.  Bulloch and Morris;  20.

      -the Soviets also profitted from their huge gold, silver,  and diamond
      exports,  because  precious  metals  and gems went up in value sharply
      with the Crisis.

 36.  Epstein; 19, 20.

 37.  Kondracke; 12.

 38.  McAlvany,  Don.  "Middle East Aflame:  Oil Wars in the Persian  Gulf".
      'McAlvany Intelligence Advisor' (serial). Phoenix, AZ: 8/90.

      Reprinted in:

      'The Fatima Crusader' (serial). Constable, NY: 10-11/90; 5-10.

 39.  Morris,   Robert.   'Our  Globe  Under  Siege   III'.   Better   Baby;
      Philadelphia, PA: 1988; 182.

      Referenced in:  'McAlvany Intelligence Advisor' (see note 35).

      Specifically,  Morris  quoted  columnist  Paul  Scott who listed eight
      facilities which included:

      1)  A  major  naval  facility at Umn Qasr at the mouth of the Shaat-al
          Arab which  flows  into  the  Persian  Gulf.  This  base  includes
          maintenance  facilities  for  ships  and  basing for equipment and
          ammunition.  There are also boarding ramps for Hovercraft that can
          transport naval infantry from the base.

      2)  The naval installations and facilities at Zubior  and  al  Qurnah,
          the  former  on  a body of water below the Euphrates River and the
          latter on the Tigris.  Both ports can service Soviet warships.

      3)  There are air bases at Sulaymaniyah in the northeast mosul  in  the
          north central sector of the country.

 40.  Darwish and Alexander; 136.

 41.  "Moscow  Fears  Iraq  Won't  Pay Back Big Debt".  'Oil & Gas Journal':
      9/17/90; 28.

 42.  Rosenthal, A.  M.  "Why Moscow Wants to Save Saddam".

      Printed in:

      Sifry,  Micah and  Christopher  Cerf  (eds).  'The  Gulf  War  Reader:
      History, Documents, Opinions'.  Times Books; New York, NY: 1991; 346.

 43.  Mann, Paul. "Judging the Soviets in the Gulf: Are They as Weak as They
      Look?". 'Aviation Week & Space Technology': 12/3/90; 24.

 44.  "Iraq Hints at Flexibility;  Allies Focus Bombardment".  'Gannett News
      Service': 2/12/91.

 45.  Howard,  Michael and Robert Lovett.  "The Burdens of  Victory".  'U.S.
      News & World Report': 7/13/91; 48-49.

 46.  Darwish and Alexander; 283.

 47.  Mann.

 48.  Bulloch and Morris; 20.

 49.  Private source.

 50.  For instance, see:

      Sterling, Claire. 'The Terror Network: The Secret War of International
      Terrorism'.  Berkley Books; New York, NY: 1982.

 51.  Epstein; 20.

 52.  Kondracke; 10.

 53.  McAlvany.

 54.  Epstein.

 55.  Epstein.

 56.  Leonard, Paul.  "Countdown to Destruction". 'The Fatima Crusader': 10-
      11/90; 13.

 57.  "Iraq Hints at Flexibility; Allies Focus Bombardment".

 58.  'The   American   Sentinel'   (serial).   Phillips   Publishing   Co.;
      Washington, DC: 8/90.

      Quoted in: "Newspage". 'The Fatima Crusader': 10-11/90; 11.

 59.  Walte,  Juan.  "U.S.  Tried to Nab Soviets Aiding Iraq".  'USA Today':
      3/19/91; A4.

      Also see:

      "Some Secrets  of  Gulf  War  Might  Never  Be  Told".  'Gannett  News
      Service': 3/19/91.

      "Iraq Hints at Peace Effort;  Demands End to Air War; U.S.  Cautious".
      'USA Today': 2/13/91; A1.

 60.  Many people have indicated a belief that Western intelligence must  be
      aware  of  the  potential for a Soviet grand deception or deception in
      the Gulf as is spelt out in my views.  However,  this a  false  belief
      premised  on  ignorant  and irrational faith.  If Western intelligence
      had any suspicion of a deception,  the West would never  have  dropped
      its  guard  the  way  it  has- particularly against a nuclear surprise
      attack.  Every indication is  that  Western  'intelligence'  has  been
      outsmarted  by  the 'intelligencia' of the East.  To better understand
      how this could be so, see:

      Epstein,  Edward Jay.  'Deception:  The Secret War Between the KGB and
      the CIA'.  Simon & Schuster; New York, NY: 1989.

      Golitsyn,  Anatoliy.  'New  Lies  for  Old:  The Communist Strategy of
      Deception and Disinformation'. Dodd, Mead; New York, NY: 1984.

      It should be noted  here  that,  if  the  Soviets  have  succeeded  in
      misleading us, it is not due so much to their deceptions as to our own
      self-deceptions.  Lenin  once  said  that the best way to overcome the
      West was to:  'tell them what they want to hear'.  It seems  Gorbachev
      may have carried this logic one step further to:  'show them what they
      want to see'.  The point is that Westerners have proven time and  time
      again  that they will 'hear what they want to hear' and 'see what they
      want to see' regardless of the truth of the matter.  In  other  words,
      our  selfish  fears,  pride,  and  desires,  mislead us into accepting
      illusions- lies- rather than reality and the  truth.  Hitler  realized
      this  and  used  it to his advantage resulting in World War II and the
      virtual loss of free-Europe.  Now it appears history may be  repeating
      itself  and  the consequence will be World War III and the loss of the

 61.  See note 2.

 62.  Most  of these are readily apparent points- for specific examples see:
      Howard; 44.  Also see:

      Schoenfeld,  Gabriel.  "The Loser of the Gulf  War  Is...  the  Soviet
      Military." (editorial) 'Wall Street Journal': 3/19/91; A24.

 63.  That the Soviets are planning to invade Europe later on would  explain
      why they left large stocks of ammunition in Eastern Europe in the wake
      of their military pull-out.

      See:  Kruzel, 222.

 64.  Birnbaum, Jesse.  "How Many Wars Can the U.S. Fight?". 'Time'. 3/4/91;

 65.  Birnbaum; 38.

 66.  Montgomery, Paul L. "NATO Is Planning to Cut U.S.  Forces in Europe by
      50%". 'New York Times': 5/29/91; A1.

 67.  "Spirit  of  CFE  Treaty  Disappears  East  of the Urals".  'Financial
      Times': 11/15/90; (European News), 2.

      "A Factor in the Soviet Food Crisis". 'New York Times': 1/4/91; A4.

 68.  Mendelsohn,  Jack.  "Just How Deceitful are the Soviets?"  (editorial)
      'Wall Street Journal': 2/26/91; A15.

 69.  "A Glimpse at the Troubled Soviet Army".  'U.S.  News & World Report':
      12/17/90; 54.

 70.  In  late  September  of  1991,  George  Bush  ordered  that  the  U.S.
      strategic  bomber  fleet  be  stood-down  and  dismantled and that all
      Minuteman II ICBM's be deactivated.  Furthermore,  he  announced  that
      all tactical nuclear weapons were to be pulled off U.S.  naval vessels
      and 80 percent of American nuclear defenses in Western Europe were  to
      be removed.  These goals are today complete (completion date:  July 1,
      1992).  This information is widely available in popular press reports.

      For a report on how America's guard against  a  Soviet  nuclear  sneak
      attack has been significantly lowered, see:

      "Why  America  New Sentinel Works Only a 40-Hour Week".  'U.S.  News &
      World Report': 5/20/91.

 71.  Comments following the Gulf War.  'The New York Times': 3/3/91; E2.

                *          *          *          *          *


 Beichman, Arnold. 'The Long Pretense: Soviet Treaty Diplomacy from Lenin to
     Gorbachev'.  Transaction Publishers; New Brunswick, NJ: 1991.

 Blitz, James. "Hunger in the Heart of Plenty". 'The Sunday Times': 12/9/90.

 Broder, John. "Underground Shelters Built for Soviet Leaders". 'Los Angeles
     Times': 4/30/88.

 Bulloch,  John and Harvey Morris.  'Saddam's  War'.  Faber  &  Faber,  Inc.
     Winchester, MA: 1991.

 Cline, Ray (ed).  'Behind the Smile Are Teeth of Iron'.  US Global Strategy
     Council; Washington, DC: 1988.

 Daily,  Brian and  Patrick  Parker  (eds).  'Soviet  Strategic  Deception'.
     Lexington Books; Lexingtion, MA: 1987.

 Darwish,  Adel  and  Gregory  Alexander.  'Unholy  Babylon'.  St.  Martin's
     Press.  New York, NY: 1991.

 Douglass,  Joseph  D.,  Jr.  'Soviet  Strategy  for  Nuclear  War'.  Hoover
     Institute Press; Stanford, CA: 1979.

 Epstein,  Edward  Jay.  'Deception:  The Secret War Between the KGB and the
     CIA'.  Simon & Schuster; New York, NY: 1989.

 Epstein, Edward Jay.  "Virtual Ally:  What's the Soviet Game in the Gulf?".
     'The New Republic': 9/3/90.

 "A Factor in the Soviet Food Crisis". 'New York Times': 1/4/91.

 "The Fury of Desert Storm". 'U.S. News & World Report': 3/11/91.

 Golitsyn, Anatoliy.  'New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of Deception
     and Disinformation'.  Dodd, Mead; New York, NY: 1984.

 Grier,  Peter.  "Iraq's Chemical Weapons Found to  be  Potent".  'Christian
     Science Monitor': 1/23/92.

 "The Guns of August". 'The New Republic': 9/3/90.

 Howard, Michael and Robert Lovett.  "The Burdens of Victory". 'U.S.  News &
     World Report': 7/13/91.

 "The 100-Hour War". 'U.S. News & World Report': 3/11/91.

 "Intelligence in a World of Change (Satellites  and  Humans)".  'Government
     Executive': 3/92.

 "Iraq  Hints  at  Flexibility;  Allies  Focus  Bombardment".  'Gannett News
     Service': 2/12/91.

 "Iraq Hints at Peace Effort; Demands End to Air War; U.S.  Cautious".  'USA
     Today': 2/13/91.

 Kintner, William. 'Soviet Global Strategy'.  Hero Books; Fairfax, VA: 1987.

 Kintner, William and Harriet Scott (eds). 'The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet
     Military Affairs'.  University of Oklahoma Press; Norman, OK: 1968.

 Kondracke, Morton. "Saddamnation". 'The New Republic': 5/7/90.

 Kruzel,  Joseph (ed).  '1991-92 American Defense Annual'.  Lexington Books;
     Lexington, MA: 1992.

 Leonard, Paul.  "Countdown to Destruction". 'The Fatima Crusader' (serial).
     Constable, NY: 10-11/90.

 Mann,  Paul.  "Judging the Soviets in the Gulf:  Are They as Weak  as  They
     Look?". 'Aviation Week & Space Technology': 12/3/90.

 McAlvany,  Don.  "Middle  East  Aflame:  Oil  Wars  in  the  Persian Gulf".
     'McAlvany Intelligence Advisor' (serial). Phoenix, AZ: 8/90.

 Mendelsohn, Jack. "Just How Deceitful are the Soviets?" (editorial).  'Wall
     Street Journal': 2/26/91.

 Meisler,  Stanley.  "300 Iraq  SCUDs  Missing,  U.N.  Team  Reports".  'Los
     Angeles Times': 11/2/91.

 Montgomery,  Paul  L.  "NATO  Is  Planning to Cut U.S.  Forces in Europe by
     50%". 'New York Times': 5/29/91.

 Morris,  Robert.  'Our Globe Under Siege III'.  Better Baby;  Philadelphia,
     PA: 1987.

 "Moscow Fears Iraq Won't Pay Back Big Debt". 'Oil & Gas Journal': 9/17/90.

 "Newspage". 'The Fatima Crusader' (serial).  Constable, NY: 10-11/90.

 Parks,  Michael.  "Food  Shipments  Trapped in Web of Soviet Inefficiency".
     'Los Angeles Times': 12/11/90.

 Schoenfeld, Gabriel. "The Loser of the Gulf War Is...  the Soviet Military"
     (editorial). 'Wall Street Journal'.

 Sifry,  Micah  and Christopher Cerf (eds).  'The Gulf War Reader:  History,
     Documents, Opinions'.  Times Books; New York, NY: 1991.

 Sleeper, Raymond (ed).  'Mesmerized By The Bear'.  Dodd,  Mead,  & Co.  New
     York, NY: 1987.

 "A Slow Slide Toward War". 'Newsweek': 7/2/90.

 "Some  Secrets  of  Gulf  War  Might Never Be Told".  Gannett News Service.

 'Soviet Military Power'.  US Department of Defense; Washington, DC.

 "Spirit of CFE Treaty Disappears East of  the  Urals".  'Financial  Times':
        11/15/90; (European News).

 Sterling,  Claire.  'The  Terror  Network:  The Secret War of International
     Terrorism'.  Berkley Books; New York, NY: 1982.

 Tyler,  Patrick E.  "Iraq's War Toll Estimated by U.S.;  100,000 Killed and
     300,000  hurt  in  Persian Gulf cited as tentative figures".  'New York
     Times': 6/5/91.

 "U.N.  Survey Calls Iraq's War Damage Near-Apocalyptic".  'New York Times':

 "U.S.  Says  Early  Air  Attack  Caught Iraq Off Guard".  'New York Times'.

 Walte,  Juan.  "U.S.  Tried to  Nab  Soviets  Aiding  Iraq".  'USA  Today'.