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The Persian Gulf Deception
***THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION***
(December, 1991)
(Revised: Summer, 1992)
-Outline of Paper-
A. Introduction
B. Inconsistencies and Contradictions
C. The Deception
D. Confirmation
E. The Strategy
F. Conclusion
* * * * * *
"The great masses of the people...
will more easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one."
(Adolph Hitler)
"We have no right ever to forget that psychological warfare
is a struggle for winning people's minds."
(Mikhail Gorbachev)
* * * * * *
THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION
-Introduction-
"I have a great feeling of a great victory. Anyone who dares
even imply that we did not achieve a great victory obviously
doesn't know what the hell he's talking about." (1)
{Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf}
(Gulf War Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command)
Since Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union there have been
persistent and exceptional historical contradictions in Soviet behavior.
The consequence of this contradictory behavior has been the breakup of the
Soviet Union and the seeming demise of the 'communist' threat.
Although on the surface the apparent, dramatic turn around in Kremlin
thinking and the consequent collapse of Soviet communism may seem like
positive developments for the West, there is reason to believe they may
actually not be. Secular trends indicate there is a possibility that the
Soviets have undermined their own political and economic power as part of a
grand deception. There is reason to believe that Russia is currently
misleading the world for the purpose of global military domination. An
unprecedented campaign of large-scale deceptions may be underway which has
totally misled the West such that the East can now successfully launch a
surprise third world war. (2)
The crisis in the Persian Gulf may have been a strategic deception
engineered by Moscow.
For America and the West, the Gulf Crisis had a sensational outcome.
First off, through the Gulf War the threat of Saddam Hussein was seemingly
checked and Western interests in the Middle East were secured. Secondly,
the U.S.-led Coalition victory in the Gulf War helped the United States
overcome its disgrace in Vietnam and reinstated its position as the
dominant world hegemon. Lastly, the positive resolution of the Gulf Crisis
marked the beginning of a 'New World Order' in which the threat of
militaristic totalitarianism appears to be dead and the superpowers are
cooperating toward international peace and security.
The problem with the Gulf Crisis and its positive outcome is that it
all may have been literally too good to be true. Something which the West
seemed to conveniently overlook throughout the Crisis was that Iraq had
been a close ally of the Soviet Union for decades prior to the Invasion of
Kuwait. Consequently, the humiliating defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in
the Gulf War, like the modern defeat of Soviet communism, may have been a
deception- an inherently contradictory lie. There is reason to believe
that Saddam intentionally provoked the Gulf War with the sole intention of
handing the West a 'great victory'. He would have done this in cooperation
with Moscow as an important part of an overall strategy to mislead America,
its Western allies, and the world as a whole, so that the East can
successfully launch a surprise attack against the West. In other words,
when it comes right down to it, the Gulf Crisis and subsequent Allied
victory over Iraq may have in actuality been nothing but a seductive lie.
In the following pages I will thoroughly examine how the Persian Gulf
Crisis may have been a deception. There will be four major parts. In part
I, numerous inconsistencies and contradictions associated with the behavior
of Iraq and the Soviets throughout the Gulf Crisis will be brought to
light. In the second part, a circumstantial case will be built for a
Persian Gulf deception based upon the implications of the given
inconsistencies and contradictions. This case will be confirmed by
directly incriminating evidence in part III. In the final part, possible
strategic aims of a Persian Gulf deception will be discussed.
-Part I: Inconsistencies and Contradictions-
-Iraq-
Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait was inconsistent- it was a blatant
provocation for war with the West that went against Iraq's best interest.
Going into the Gulf Crisis Iraq had become a major military threat, and
potential target, for the West. During the 1980's, Saddam Hussein built-up
one of the largest militaries in the world. By 1990, he commanded a
million-man army equipped with a vast arsenal of modern weaponry including
over 4500 tanks, almost 5000 artillery pieces, and upwards of 800 combat
aircraft (3). Saddam also controlled hundreds of anti-ship missiles and
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, as well as a stockpile of chemical
and possibly biolological munitions. During the 1980's Iraq developed an
extensive military infrastructure involving a comprehensive command,
control, communications, and intelligence (C,3I) network. By the summer of
1990, throughout Iraq were radar stations, anti-aircraft artillery,
surface-to-air missile batteries, and weapons production plants which
included facilities for the research and development of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons. (4)
As Iraqi military power grew, the West became increasingly concerned
about its expanding regional influence. In early May of 1990- just prior
to the Gulf Crisis- 'The New Republic' warned:
"The prospect of Saddam Hussein as top man in the Arab world
and dominant power in the Persian Gulf is not one that civilized
people should welcome. This man is a ruthless killer with a
deep paranoia about the West and grandiose ambitions to be a new
Nasser and to re-create the glories that were Babylon and
Mesopotamia." (5)
All in all, going into the Invasion of Kuwait, the West saw Iraq as a
dangerous military threat and destabilizing force in the richest oil region
of the world. Saddam's growing military power, coupled with his staunch
anti-Israeli and anti-Western mindset, was becoming a major concern for the
West. Iraq could someday unify the Arab world such that the West would be
held hostage by its oil dependency. Even worse, Iraq could eventually
unleash a major regional war involving weapons of mass destruction which
could result in the destruction of Israel. By 1990, Saddam Hussein had
come to embody many of "the serious security problems of the post-cold war
era: aggression, terrorism, virulant tribalism, and missile, nuclear, and
chemical weapons proliferation" (6).
In the weeks and months before Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, Saddam was
putting out some not-so-subtle hints as to his belligerent intentions,
giving the West an opportunity to consider the possibility of a future
confrontation. In a speech made on April 3rd, 1990, Saddam threatened to
"make fire eat up half of Israel", a comment which drew widespread Western
consternation (7). In May, U.S. officials confirmed press rumors that
Saddam told Kuwait: "Iraqi security may require him to occupy Kuwaiti
territory in the future" (8). Such bellicose remarks likely led Western
leaders to consider possible responses should Iraq become aggressive in the
near-future.
As Iraq began to blatantly threaten Kuwait in late July of 1990, the
United States made it clear that it would respond forcefully if need be.
The prevailing sentiment of America's leaders at that time was reflected by
Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato who denounced Saddam as: "...a butcher,
a killer, a bully. Some day we're going to have to stand up to him. Why
not now?" (9). The State Department announced that the United States would
"remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective
self-defence of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and long-
standing ties" (10). To underscore America's willingness to use military
force against Iraq should events warrant such action, a joint naval
exercise with the United Arab Emirates was hastily arranged and initiated
in the northern Gulf (11).
Apparently unintimidated by American posturing, on August 2nd, 1990,
Saddam proved good on his word and Iraq invaded Kuwait. The West received
the opportunity it needed to do something decisive about the growing Iraqi
threat. Almost immediately, the United States and its Western Allies began
preparing for a war against Iraq. Saddam's military empire could be
forcefully checked before Iraqi regional influence grew too far or before
Iraq's military might became too strong- eventually including nuclear
weapons.
Saddam's provocation was ideal for a decisive Western military
response. As the 1991-92 'American Defense Annual' later put it: "Saddam
Hussein... proved to be a near perfect villian, and the coalition aligned
against him had a compelling 'casus belli'" (12). A ruthless military
dictator, infamous for gassing his own people, blitzkrieged the small,
peaceful nation of Kuwait in blatant violation of international law.
What's more, Saddam's Invasion resulted in Iraq's control of over a third
of the world's available oil reserves and "put his forces within striking
distance of one of the world's most critical resources, Saudi Arabia's oil
fields, making it necessary for the United States and other nations to act
to counter him, instead of just issuing protest statements" (13). As a
whole, through the Kuwaiti Invasion, Saddam had come to threaten half the
world's oil, a situation wholly intolerable to the oil-dependent West.
Between the Invasion and the beginning of the Gulf War, Iraq continued
to behave in a seemingly irrational manner that was inconsistent with its
own interests but favorable to Western interests.
In the wake of Saddam's overrun of Kuwait, international pressure, led
by the West, began to build on Iraq to withdraw. Immediately, U.N.
Resolution 660 was ratified which called for the unconditional withdrawal
of Iraq from Kuwait (14). Within days, U.S. military forces began flooding
into Saudi Arabia. With Saddam remaining intransigent, the United Nations
decided to impose international economic sanctions against Iraq. As Iraq
failed to respond, military forces from across the globe began flowing into
the Gulf along side the growing American build-up. On November 29th, with
a sizable Coalition force already in place, the U.N. okayed a resolution
for the forceful removal of Iraq from Kuwait by a U.S.-led international
Coalition should Saddam's forces not unilaterally leave by January 15,
1991. (15)
Saddam's intransigence as international pressure began to build made
little sense. It was apparent, given the scale of the American-led
military build-up in Saudi Arabia, that, beyond freeing Kuwait, the West
was preparing to use the Invasion of Kuwait as an excuse to destroy Iraq's
military potential and, in turn, the threat Saddam posed to Western
interests in the Middle East. Any sort of compromise or moderation on
Saddam's part could have easily undone Western attempts to organize
international support for a war and, in turn, resulted in substantial Iraqi
gains. In John Bulloch's and Harvey Morris' 'Saddam's War', it is pointed
out that:
"Had he (Saddam) contented himself with occupying the
disputed islands of Bubiyan and Warbah and that sector of the
Rumeileh oilfield which he claimed as his own, it is unlikely
the United Nations would have gone beyond the imposition of
unenforceable sanctions, or that the United States would have
dispatched a single soldier to the region... Had a puppet
government been left in charge of a nominally independent
Kuwait, it would eventually have received some recognition, at
least from the Arab world." (16)
Instead of moderation, however, Saddam remained almost completely
intransigent and belligerent toward the West. He persistently made clear
his unwillingness to be persuaded by Western intimidation. He declared
Kuwait to have always been a part of Iraq and let the world know that all
of Iraqi sovereignty- including Kuwait- would be militarily defended
against any hostile actions. Furthermore, Saddam called on moslems around
the world to rise up and launch a holy war, or 'jihad', against Western
imperialism. (17)
Saddam sometimes, and usually at the wrong times, failed to behave
according to the belligerent image he painted of himself.
Iraqi forces never preempted the build-up of the American-led Coalition
in Saudi Arabia. Saddam conveniently stood back as nations from all over
the world, particularly in the West, mobilized and imported a massive
military force. Yet, attacking while the Coalition was incomplete and
disorganized may have undermined the Coalition's ability to successfully
wage a war. Unfortunately, as is pointed out in the 1991-92 'American
Defense Annual': "It seems unlikely that future enemies will graciously
grant U.S. forces five months to prepare for battle" (18).
Even more inconsistent than failing to preempt was Saddam's release of
Western hostages. There can be little doubt that: "One act of great good
fortune was Saddam Hussein's decision to release his hostages, those human
shields whose continued presence in Iraq would have vastly complicated the
air war" (19). Specifically, Saddam made hostages out of the thousands of
Western civilians (including over 3000 Americans) who had been living in
Kuwait or Iraq when the Gulf Crisis broke out. He threatened to use them
as 'human shields' by placing them in strategic targets in order to deter
any approaching Coalition attack. These hostages became one of Saddam's
only major trump cards against a U.S.-led attack. It was apparent a
Coalition bombing campaign that would cost thousands of innocent Western
lives would have exceptionally high political costs for our leaders. In an
act of goodwill totally uncharacteristic of the 'Butcher of Baghdad',
however, Saddam released the hostages. The only major concession he made
before the Gulf War was profoundly self-contradictory in that it directly
undermined his stated intention to inflict as much damage and pain as
possible on the West. In fact, Saddam spared the lives of Westerners at
the cost of Iraqi lives later lost in unhampered Coalition bombings.
The deadline of January 15th eventually passed and the U.S.-Coalition
attacked the very next day. The Gulf War was underway as well as continued
inconsistencies and contradictions.
As General Powell correctly pointed out the following day, the
Coalition somehow 'caught Iraq off guard' and achieved tactical surprise in
its post-deadline air-attack (20). This, of course, is absurd. Going into
the Gulf War, Iraq had one of the most experienced and hardened militaries
in the world. It had just completed an almost decade-long, modern war with
Iran. Furthermore, Iraq was equipped with a sophisticated Soviet C,3I
network. To top it all off, Iraq had several months going into January
15th to prepare its defenses and a military response should war come. Yet,
Saddam's war-machine was somehow surprised by a *deadline*-attack. Upon
the initial wave of the air campaign there was little or no immediate Iraqi
response: no defensive black-out of Baghdad (something they had been
rehearsing), no immediate retaliatory SCUD missile strikes, and no Iraqi
air- or ground-counteroffensive. Fortunately for the Coalition, all its
planes ran into was well-lit targets, inept Iraqi air defenses, and some
sporadic dog-fights. Tactical surprise allowed the Coalition to swiftly
disable Saddam's war-machine with minimum associated costs.
During the air-campaign, the only significant counterattack from Iraq
was random SCUD missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Fortunately, however, chemical weapons were never involved. Of course, why
weren't they? It was not that Saddam lacked such weapons for in the War's
aftermath U.N. inspectors have found dozens of Al-Hussein chemical SCUDs
which survived Coalition bombings (21). Saddam decided not to use chemical
SCUDs even though such restraint contradicted both the threats he was
making and the image he was conveying prior to and during the Gulf War. If
Saddam really wished to spread the conflict and set-off a holy war as he
persistently claimed he would, hitting Israel with chemical SCUDs would
have been an ideal provocation. It is doubtful that Saddam feared Israeli
retaliation given that Iraq was already stomaching over two thousand
Coalition sorties a day and Israeli involvement was the intended goal. All
in all, it makes little sense that Saddam failed to use chemical SCUDs
during the Gulf War against Israel or any of Iraq's enemies, whereas he
gassed his own people only a couple of years before. (22)
In late February, the Coalition ground-offensive got underway, but
again no chemical weapons were involved. Apparently, Saddam disallowed the
use of any of the tens-of-thousands of chemical artillery shells and
chemical mines in the Iraqi arsenal (23). This is surprising given how
these weapons were employed with great success during the Iran-Iraq War
(24). The fact that chemical munitions were not used by the Iraqis is but
another inconsistency on the part of Saddam which was to the benefit of the
U.S. and the Coalition forces.
By March, Kuwait was repatriated and Saddam had managed to suffer a
defeat that seemed beyond human reasoning. With all said and done, the
U.S.-Coalition had succeeded in a total military 'rout' of Iraq's war-
hardened, well-equipped, million-man army and hardly got scratched in the
process. After six-weeks of Allied aerial bombardment involving upwards of
100,000 sorties and 141,000 tons of bombs, Saddam's vast war-machine was
left decimated at the cost of only a few dozen Coalition planes (25). Any
of Saddam's forces in Kuwait that escaped destruction during the Coalition
air-campaign proceeded to be encircled and destroyed in a 100-hour Allied
ground offensive. When the War was over, more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers
had been killed, 300,000 were injured, and around 150,000 had been taken
prisoner (26). In causing this immense massacre, the Allies suffered only
468 casualties: 149 dead, 81 missing-in-action, and 238 wounded (27).
Through the Gulf War Saddam lost some 4000 tanks, 2000 artillery pieces,
2000 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 100 aircraft, and 80 ships (28).
Furthermore, Iraq's infrastructure suffered what the U.N. later described
as 'near-apocalyptic' damage (29). The Allies, on the other hand, lost
only 4 tanks, 1 artillery piece, 9 APCs, 44 aircraft, and 2 ships (30).
All in all, Saddam's defeat at the hands of the West was so drastic and
humiliating as to be utterly nonsensical.
With the Gulf War over, the West had reason to breathe a sigh of relief
at home. Fortunately, there had been no major anti-Western terrorist
attacks associated with the Crisis. Of course, why weren't there? The CIA
"picked up all the tell-tale signs of Iraq's ability to wage chemical
warfare and launch terrorist attacks around the Middle East and Europe...
Intelligence analysts are still scratching their heads, wondering why these
capabilities were not used (31)". In other words, Saddam refrained from
launching terrorist attacks just as he failed to wage chemical attacks even
though he was fully capable of and supposedly intending to do both. Thus,
since there was no terrorism, Saddam acted in a contradictory manner which,
once again, was favorable to the West.
In the wake of the Gulf War, one of the greatest inconsistencies of all
concerning Saddam's behavior has come to light. U.N. inspections following
the Gulf War ceasefire have revealed that Iraq's program to develop nuclear
weapons, code-named 'Project Babylon' (32), was far larger and more
successful than had ever been suspected in the West. In fact, it is today
believed that Iraq may have been less than a year away from having at least
a few crude nuclear weapons when it invaded Kuwait (33). Of course, if
Saddam was interested in taking on the West and fighting the "Mother of All
Battles", why did he make his challenge when he did? Why didn't he wait a
year until he had the Bomb? Why did Saddam invade Kuwait and fight a war
with the West before developing the ultimate means by which to fulfill his
grandiose ambitions?
-The Soviets-
Throughout the Persian Gulf Crisis the Soviets behaved as
inconsistently as Saddam's Iraq.
For the Gulf Crisis, Soviet foreign policy did an about-face.
Throughout most of the United Nation's history, Moscow had tried to
undermine any Western efforts to bring about international cooperation,
particularly if such cooperation was to somehow serve Western interests.
Yet, for the Gulf Crisis, this was not so. For the first time since World
War II the Soviets cooperated with the West in organizing an international
effort.
The effort they finally chose to support was blatantly in the West's
interest and against their own.
The oil-shock stemming from the Gulf Crisis was devastating to Western
economic vitality. The West desperately needed a way to resecure its
supply of cheap oil from the Persian Gulf by freeing Kuwait and eliminating
the Iraqi threat. Without the okay of the Soviets and international
support this may never have been possible and the West's economy may very
well have been plunged into depression.
For the Soviets, on the other hand, higher oil-prices stemming from the
Gulf Crisis was a blessing. At the time, Soviet Russia was the world's
largest producer and second largest exporter of oil. Hence, the sharp rise
in oil prices meant windfall profits of hard foreign currency- something
the Soviets greatly needed. Given the price at which oil topped-out during
the Crisis, the Soviets could have hoped to increase their hard-currency
earnings by nearly $40 billion a year. (34)
Beyond oil interests, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a valuable ally and
military client which the Soviets should have wanted to keep.
By 1990, the Soviets had a long-standing and deeply-vested relationship
with Iraq. In 1972, Moscow and Baghdad signed a 'Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation' (35). Over the next two decades the Soviets poured thousands
of military 'advisers' and other specialists into Iraq who trained
Baghdad's general staff and planning officers as well as organized its
intelligence services (36). Soviet involvement in Iraq became particularly
deep after Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979. Guided by a Stalinist
philosophy, Saddam wanted to model Iraq after the Soviet military state
(37). He affirmed his commitment to Moscow when he came to power by
signing an agreement with Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov on military
cooperation and strategic consultation (38). After making the agreement,
the Soviets helped Saddam carry out a large-scale campaign to consolidate
power within Iraq and become a regional military superpower. Reflecting
Moscow's involvement, eight military facilities were constructed in Iraq
for Soviet use including both air bases and naval ports (39). All in all,
by the Kuwaiti Invasion, the Soviet Union had invested a great deal of
time, energy, and resources in the construction of Saddam's totalitarian
regime and modern war-machine- an investment they likely meant to make good
on.
In developing its massive war-machine, Iraq became an ideal Soviet
military clientele state. During the 1980's Iraq became the world's
largest importer of arms. It is estimated that between 1980 and 1990
Saddam spent some $100 billion dollars on military equipment (that compares
to just under $70 billion spent on arms by Britian or France during the
same period) (40). Since 90 percent of Iraq's military was bought from the
Soviets, it should be apparent just how valuable a customer Saddam was to
Moscow.
Since Iraq purchased most of its arms from the Soviets on credit, it
was in Moscow's interest to maintain Saddam's regime and Iraq's economic
vitality. Going into the Gulf Crisis, Baghdad owed Moscow some $80
billion. For 1990 alone, the Soviets were expecting to receive $2 billion
from Iraq (41). Given the seeming economic distress in Soviet Russia,
preserving Iraq's economic potential should have been important to them.
In a nutshell, the Soviets should not have wanted to turn their back on
Iraq during the Gulf Crisis. As 'Times' columnist A.M. Rosenthal pointed
out at the time, doing so meant that:
"Moscow will lose its only remaining ally in the area. Also:
its best customer for weapons. Also: the military and political
prestige it invested in Saddam Hussein for so long." (42)
The principal reason Moscow forged a close relationship with Baghdad
and made such a deep military commitment is because Iraq has tremendous
geopolitical strategic value. Iraq is at the heart of the Persian Gulf and
the richest oil-region in the world. Thus, it is a focal point not only of
the Arab world, but also of vital Western energy interests. A foothold in
Iraq enhanced Moscow's influence over other Arab nations and gave the
Soviets access to the aquilles heel of the oil-dependent West.
Because of Iraq's strategic value, it was widely believed the Soviets
would never let the West attack and defeat Saddam Hussein. Such a scenario
entailed a shift in the regional balance of power that compromised Soviet
interests and benefitted the West. Just prior to the Gulf War, 'Aviation
Week and Space Technology' reported:
"...the destruction of Iraq's military, if it came to that,
would augment the strategic weight of Israel and Iran. This is
not in Soviet interests." (43)
At the Hoover Institute, a national defense think-tank, experts believed
that the Soviets would "do everything in their power to keep that man
(Saddam) in there... They do not want that part of the world dominated by
us" (44).
All in all, Moscow had vested interests in its relationship with
Baghdad such that they should have stood behind, or at least sought to
protect, Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Gulf Crisis. Yet, they did not.
In fact, they opened the way for the West to launch a war against their
valuable Iraqi ally:
"The importance of Soviet cooperation cannot be overstated.
If the Soviets had pursued their traditional policy of blocking
agreements at the United Nations and defending their prothghs in
the Middle East, not only would united action have been
impossible but fear of provoking a superpower confrontation
might well have deterred the United States from acting." (45)
Although at least some contemplation would have been expected, the
Soviets turned their back on Saddam and helped out the West immediately and
without reservation. On the day of the Invasion, American Secretary of
State James Baker was visiting his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze,
in Siberia. On news of the Invasion, the two got together, and within just
a couple of hours they had worked out the draft wording for U.N.
Resolution 660 which called for an immediate, unconditional Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait. (46)
As Western forces began piling into the Gulf, Moscow failed to use its
diplomatic leverage over Saddam to remove Iraq from Kuwait. This, of
course, makes little sense given what the Soviets had to gain from
preserving Iraq. Yet, while a diplomatic solution was still possible
before Iraq was destroyed by Western military force, the Soviets sat on
their hands. If they were interested in seeing a peaceful resolution to
the Crisis they should have been able to produce one since the Soviet Union
was Iraq's principal political- and military-supporter. It is apparent
that: "The Soviet Union is the one power that could have brought Iraq to
terms early on if Moscow had really clenched its fist" (47).
In fact, Saddam may have backed down if only the Soviets informed
Baghdad of their willingness to let the U.S.-led Coalition attack. In
'Saddam's War', the authors revealed:
"In Baghdad, officials told us that they had their links to
Moscow, and they were quite certain that at the Helsinki summit
in mid-September the influence of Soviet military thinking made
Gorbachev hold back from any endorsement of military action
against Iraq if sanctions proved ineffective. Whether or not
this was true, the Iraqis firmly believed that it was and that
Soviet generals would prevent any attack on them. This
perception undoubtedly influenced the Baghdad government's
policy of brinksmanship." (48)
As war approached the Soviets actually helped prepare the U.S.-led
effort to destroy Iraq. They fed the West important codes and intelligence
on the Iraqi military which simplified the Coalition's offensive (49).
Hence, the Soviets went extraordinarily out of their way to facilitate a
Western-led attack against their valuable ally.
-Part II: The Deception-
What can be drawn from the above inconsistencies and contradictions in
Iraqi and Soviet behavior? Quite simply, it appears something seriously
afoul may have been underlying the Persian Gulf Crisis. 'Contra'-'diction'
entails that something is contrary to what it appears to mean. This is the
essence of a lie. The contradictions associated with the Gulf Crisis
indicate that it may have been some sort of lie- the opposite of what it
appeared to be.
There was a prevailing and consistent theme to the contradictory
behavior of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Soviet Union during the Gulf
Crisis. Both nations persistently acted in a way that facilitated a
sensational Western Gulf War victory over Iraq. If, as part of a large-
scale deception, Soviet Russia and Saddam's Iraq were working together to
bring about the Gulf War and have Iraq decisively lose to the West, then
the seemingly inconsistent and irrational behavior of Bagdhad and Moscow
makes sense.
Saddam's Invasion of Kuwait was an ideal provocation to lure the West
into launching a war against Iraq. By 1990, the increasing threat posed by
Saddam's radical anti-Western policies, growing military power, and nuclear
weapons development program, most likely had the West seeking an excuse to
stop Iraq short. As Saddam began to make belligerent threats, increasingly
directed at Kuwait, the West was given ample time to muse the possibility
of fighting a needed war against Iraq. When Saddam actually invaded
Kuwait, there was a blatant violation of international law and half of the
world's known oil reserves came under an Iraqi threat- the West received
both an ideal excuse and an unavoidable provocation to wage a mitigating
war against Saddam's military empire.
Following the Invasion, the Soviets made it easy for the West to launch
a war against Iraq. With the U.S. Secretary of State already in Russia,
Moscow was able to immediately cooperate and the initial U.N. call for
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait resulted. The reason the Soviets didn't take
time to contemplate their response is because they had preplanned it. As
the U.S. worked with the international community to set the stage for a
full-scale war against Iraq, the Soviets continued to cooperate including
their okay for the use of military force against their Iraqi ally. As the
deadline for war approached, Moscow made sure not to use diplomatic
pressure to get Saddam to back down because the intent was to make way for
a Western attack.
Going into the January 15th deadline, Saddam made sure the West could
go through with the War it desired by remaining intransigent and
belligerent. Even as it became apparent that the Coalition force was more
than large enough to overwhelm Iraq, Saddam failed to compromise on Kuwait.
Saddam took steps prior to the Gulf War to open the way for a
successful Coalition attack with minimum potential costs for the West. By
failing to preempt the build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia, Iraq made it
easy for the U.S.-led Coalition to achieve a military superiority and fully
organize itself, thus facilitating Western success. On top of this, by
releasing his Western 'human shield' hostages, Saddam removed a substantial
mitigating factor to a Coalition air-attack and greatly reduced the
potential costs the West would face in launching a war, both in terms of
Western lives and consequent political costs.
For the initial Coalition air-attack, Saddam left his forces off-guard
and unprepared, allowing the Allies the advantage of tactical surprise.
Targets were left vulnerable, no initial military response was prepared or
executed, and defensive responses were subdued, thus the door was left open
for the the Allies to swiftly disable the potential of Saddam's war-
machine. This gave the West an inflated sense of technical and strategic
superiority, something which would be further fed throughout the War.
As the War progressed and Saddam's empire was being decimated, Iraq
refrained from using chemical weapons so that the West's Gulf victory would
be clean-cut and total. Saddam made sure not to hit Israel with chemical
SCUDs in that such a provocation would have surely elicited a potent
Israeli military response. Israeli involvement in the Gulf War could have
easily led to a breakup of the Coalition and possibly spawned a larger
regional conflict. By keeping chemical weapons off the battlefield, Saddam
minimized Coalition casualties and kept the conflict from escalating in a
way which could have led to a breakdown in international support for the
War and/or threatened the Coalition's cohesion. All in all, by not using
chemical weapons, Saddam minimized Western losses- both in terms of lives
and associated political costs, thus insuring that the victory handed to
the West was total.
Throughout the whole affair there was no associated terrorism so that
the deception would go smoothly and Soviet involvement would remain
undiscovered. Extensive evidence has been uncovered which indicates that
Moscow has been behind much of international terrorism (50). Thus, there
is reason to believe that, prior to the Gulf Crisis, the Kremlin may have
put out some sort of restraining order on both Saddam and international
terrorist organizations in general. This would have been done for two
reasons. First off, it was important to constrain hostilities as much as
possible to the Persian Gulf region. Aggravating other tensions, such as
between the Arabs and Israel, would have threatened both international
support for the Gulf War and the exceptional nature of the West's victory.
Secondly, terrorism could have opened up linkages to Moscow that Western
intelligence might discover and trace, thus leading to an uncovering of the
deception.
When the Gulf War ended and Iraq had been forced from Kuwait, Saddam
had managed to achieve exactly what he intended from the start. He
suffered a drastic, humiliating defeat while inflicting minimal damage on
the U.S.-led Coalition. Thus, the West was handed a sensational, total
victory in the Gulf.
As for the surprising extent of Iraq's nuclear program, Saddam
challenged the West before he had the Bomb because 'Project Babylon' was
most valuable as bait for a Western attack. Should Saddam have invaded
Kuwait once Iraq had nuclear weapons, the odds are that there never would
have been a Gulf War, and, if there was, it wouldn't have been a 'great
victory' for the West.
If it seems difficult to believe that Saddam might have staged the Gulf
Crisis under Kremlin order, simply consider the alternative: How could have
Saddam invaded Kuwait without Moscow's knowledge and consent?
In a New Republic article, 'Virtual Ally: What's the Soviet Game in the
Gulf', which came out just after the Crisis erupted, Edward Jay Epstein, an
expert on Soviet intelligence, asked the provocative question:
"Did the USSR have advance knowledge of well-designed Iraqi
plans to invade Kuwait? After all, unlike the United States,
the Soviet Union had military advisers in Iraq attached to the
helicopter, tank, logistic, and radar units used for the
invasion, and the KGB presumably had developed sources from the
three generations of Iraqi staff and planning officers trained
by Moscow?" (51)
As for consent, according to Claudia Wright of 'Foreign Affairs', in
the 1980's the U.S. State Department thought of Saddam Hussein as "so
beholden to the Soviet Union as to be incapable of autonomous foreign
policy" (52). Given how dependent Iraq was on the Soviets- particularly in
building up and maintaining its military strength, and given Saddam's
Stalinist, pro-Soviet mind-set, it's unlikely Baghdad would have ever
pulled-off a stunt as reckless and potentially costly as invading Kuwait
without first seeking Moscow's approval. This is particularly true since
it would have been nearly impossible to develop and carry out such plans
without the Soviets noticing.
All in all, there is good reason to believe California Senator Bill
Richardson who remarked, "there is little doubt that the Soviets were
apprised of the invasion before it happened, helped plan it and approved
it. There is no way communist puppet Saddam Hussein would have given the
order to invade Kuwait if it were not sanctioned by Gorbachev (53)."
* * * * * *
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***THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION***
-Part III: Confirmation-
The idea that the Gulf Crisis was an intentional deception and that
Moscow was fundamentally behind the whole affair is confirmed by some
directly incriminating evidence.
There was strong evidence that the Soviets were involved with Iraq's
Invasion of Kuwait. First off, two weeks prior to the Invasion, Colonel
General Albert Makashov, former commander of the Volga-Urals Command, went
to Baghdad as a Soviet 'military counseler' (54). Since Iraq's military
command would have had difficulty handling an operation as logistically
complex as the Kuwaiti Invasion, there is reason to believe Makashov,
and/or other Russian commanders, oversaw the Invasion. This is
substantiated by the fact that there were Soviet military advisers attached
to the Iraqi helicopter, tank, logistic, and radar units used for the
Invasion of Kuwait (55). Also, 1200 Iraqi military personnel were being
trained by Soviet specialists at Odessa, inside the Soviet Union, around
the time of the Invasion (56). Further evidence of Moscow's complicity in
the Invasion stems from the fact that the Soviets sold or transferred
military spare parts to Saddam for at least five days following the August
2nd Invasion (57). What's more, when the U.S. began surveillance over
Kuwait in the wake of the Invasion, there were indications that Soviet
technicians helped the Iraqi air force jam intelligence and eavesdropping
on flights by American aircraft (58).
There was also strong evidence of Soviet complicity with Iraq
throughout the Gulf War. On numerous occasions allied forces heard Russian
language communiques on Iraqi military radios. Following the War,
returning U.S. soldiers said they saw evidence in the field that Soviet
advisers were working along with Iraqi forces. According to F. Andy
Messing, executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation,
there were over two dozen documented cases that showed Soviet involvement
in Iraq during the Gulf War. "The Soviets were all over the place", Messing
reported, Soviet advisers "continued to tune radars, fix tanks and planes
and advise (Iraqi) combat units down to the battalion level". In a Senate
Foreign Relations briefing paper published February 21st, 1991, it was
reported that: "For two days in February, Russian language and voices were
communicating over Iraqi military networks". Furthermore, the Soviets
repositioned satellites over the Gulf region and were "supplying targeting
information to the Iraqis for mobile missile launchers". The report
outlined how Soviet advisers were "helping Iraqis fire SCUD missiles at
Israel and Saudi Arabia". On February 25th, two days after the ground war
began, former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said during a BBC
interview that the Soviet Union was still supplying arms to Iraq. Despite
the strong evidence of Soviet complicity, the Kremlin denied any
involvement with Iraq and assured the West that its advisers and personnel
were pulled out soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait. (59)
All in all, there appears to be sufficient indirect and direct evidence
to believe that the Persian Gulf Crisis was a Soviet-engineered deception.
The inconsistencies and contradictions in Iraqi and Soviet behavior
throughout the Gulf Crisis build a strong circumstantial case for a
deception in the Gulf. Based upon the direct evidence above, there seems
little doubt that the Soviets were both aware of and involved in the
Invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, it is clear that the Soviets
underhandedly backed the Iraqis throughout the Gulf War. The logical
explanation for the directly incriminating evidence is that the
circumstantial case is correct. Moscow and Baghdad worked together to
create a large-scale deception in the Persian Gulf.
-Note-
Undoubtedly, Western intelligence had some idea of Soviet
involvement in the Gulf. However, their interpretation of the
connection was most likely misled. Backed-up by reassuring
Soviet excuses, Western analysts would downplay the importance
and implications of any Soviet involvement. This is because the
West would either have to accept that Saddam was a fool and they
were winning or they were the fools and would end up losing in a
most tragic way. Western arrogance and fear would take over
from there, something the Soviets could count on. (60)
-Part IV: The Strategy-
Why would Moscow have had Iraq stage the Gulf War and its
own defeat? Why would have Saddam Hussein gone along with such
a humiliating plan? Because the Gulf Crisis may have served as
an important deception to set the stage for a successful
surprise attack by the East against the West and, in turn,
totalitarian domination of the world. Because Saddam Hussein,
as a reward for his current sacrifices, may eventually receive
the power to 're-create the glories that were Babylon and
Mesopotamia' and then have dominion over them. By accepting
defeat in the "Mother of All 'Battles'", Saddam may have paved
the way for totalitarianism to win the Mother of All 'Wars':
World War III.
As a deception, the Gulf Crisis would have served important military
and political strategic aims of Moscow and its Eastern counterparts.
In that it is not popularly perceived or expected, Russia, in concert
with other military powers of the East, may be pursuing a grand strategy
for world domination which involves launching a surprise third world war
against the West (61). The central idea of any such strategy would be to
instill a false sense of security in the West. Such a false sense of
security will minimimize the West's military potential and maximize Western
vulnerability. This is true for two main reasons. First off, with no
sense of a threat, the West will reduce its military preparedness.
Secondly, upon attack, the East would have the advantage of surprise- a key
ingredient to success in a war involving rapid mass destruction.
The principal way in which Moscow may be trying to instill a false
sense of security in the West is deceit. By intentionally creating and
exaggerating the image of weakness and incapacitation, along with pursuing
cooperative, peace-oriented policies favorable to the West, the perceived
Soviet military threat has been virtually eliminated, America has come to
trust its long-time Russian foe, and Western arrogance has been inflated to
blinding proportions. Consequently, a tremendous, potentially false sense
of security has developed in the West entailing a high degree of
vulnerability.
If, indeed, the Gulf crisis was a deception, then it was tailor-made
for a strategy as outlined above. First off, by creating a serious
international crisis in which critical Western interests were at stake,
Moscow gave itself the opportunity to cooperate with the West in a manner
that seemed to reflect a progressive, peace-oriented change of heart. This
significantly fostered Western trust. Secondly, since the West was allowed
such a substantial victory over Iraq, and because Saddam's military state
was of Soviet-design, the West's sense of superiority to the East was
significantly inflated by the Gulf War, particularly with respect to
military capabilities (62). Third, since Moscow turned its back on a
valuable military ally during the Gulf Crisis, the image that Russia is
incapacitated and increasingly interested in peaceful coexistence was
reinforced and exagerrated. Lastly, on a broader level, the isolation and
utter military defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq served as a symbolic end to
the power of military totalitarian regimes.
A provocative example of how Western trust may have been directly
exploited by the Soviets for successfully waging a surprise third world war
can be seen in interrelated developments surrounding the Gulf Crisis and
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. In November of 1990,
during the middle of the Gulf Crisis, the United States signed the CFE
treaty with the Soviet Union. The treaty entails major reductions in both
sides' European theatre conventional forces into 1994.
The CFE treaty is highly favorable to the Soviets in the context of
their initiating a third world war with a preemptive, nuclear surprise
attack against the West. The reason this is so has to do with the fact
that the United States is an ocean away from the European continent,
whereas the Soviet Union is directly attached to it. Following a Soviet
nuclear attack, America would be unable to reinforce its European allies
because the necessary ports, airfields, men and equipment will have been
destroyed. Consequently, it would be relatively easy for Russia to
reorganize the Soviet army and march across Western Europe (63). Thus, the
U.S. force withdrawals under the CFE treaty may be benefitting Russia if,
indeed, a nuclear surprise attack is being planned.
The Gulf Crisis sped-up and augmented the U.S. pullout from Europe. A
substantial portion of the half-million soldiers and military equipment
that poured into Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War was pulled out of Western
Europe (64). For instance, half of America's mechanized divisions in
Europe were drawn into the Gulf. From Germany alone, more than 70,000
soldiers and 40,000 tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment were moved
to Saudi Arabia (65). Following the Gulf War, with superpower trust
elevated, many of the forces pulled from Western Europe returned to the
U.S. rather than the European theatre because it was to be removed by 1994
under the terms of the CFE treaty anyways (66).
The Gulf Crisis, along with technicalities in the CFE treaty, was used
by the Soviets to stockpile military equipment behind the Ural mountains-
an important preparatory measure prior to waging a surprise attack- without
alarming the West. Just before signing the CFE agreement during the middle
of the Gulf Crisis, the Soviets scurried over 70,000 pieces of military
equipment east of the Ural mountains (according to Moscow's count) (67).
On top of a large number of planes, helicopters, and armoured combat
vehicles, 20,000 tanks and over 34,000 artillery pieces were moved. This
accounts for half the tanks and two-thirds of the artillery the Soviets had
prepositioned against Western Europe up to that time. Placing the
equipment behind the Urals protects it from being counted under the CFE
treaty limits. It also protects it from Western missile and/or air attacks
and puts the equipment in a strategic position for later use in a re-
conquest of Eastern Europe and offensive on Western Europe. In a Februaury
opposing-editorial to the Wall Street Journal, the Deputy Director of the
Arms Control Association, Jack Mendelsohn, commented that: "...placing
these weapons in storage behind the Urals says something important about
Soviet intentions regarding a surprise attack or general war in Europe"
(68). NATO's supreme commander (retired: 6/92), General John Galvin, had
this to say about the stockpile: "My concern is that this equipment is
there for future use. It's big, big numbers. But I know it's just sitting
there in the snow- tanks and airplanes side by side, sometimes for
kilometers at a time" (69). For the most part, however, the West
disregarded the provocative Soviet move. Western suspicions were minimized
due to growing superpower trust, the distracting events in the Gulf, and
the idea that the Soviets may have simply been seeking to circumvent the
CFE treaty.
As can be readily surmised, the general idea of the Gulf Crisis and
Moscow's strategy in general may involve seducing the West with lies in
order to successfully wage a surprise third world war. It may be that
Gorbachev and Saddam are seeking to achieve long-run victory by allowing
their own short-run defeats. The West seems to have been easily seduced by
what may prove to be the staged death of Eastern military totalitarianism
and an illusory global victory of Western society. Such a lie is simply
too tempting for indulgent, proud Westerners to refuse. As a consequence
of this, Western vulnerability is at a post-war extreme and its military
potential has been significantly compromised. Thus, the path may have been
opened for an all-out surprise attack from the East.
-Conclusion-
Summarily, there is substantial reason to believe the Gulf Crisis was
not what it appeared to be. In fact, it may have been the total opposite
of what it seemed- a total lie. Instead of being a 'great victory', as
General Schwarzkopf believes, the Gulf War may have been a deception which
is being used toward the utter defeat of the West and global victory of
Eastern totalitarianism.
A logical explanation for the pervasive inconsistencies and
contradictions in Iraqi and Soviet behavior throughout the Gulf Crisis and
Gulf War is that the whole affair may have been some sort of staged
deception. It is possible that Saddam invaded Kuwait under Kremlin order
with the sole intention of provoking a war with the West. By cooperating
with the West in an unprecedented manner, the Soviets opened the way for
the Gulf War. Once war came, Saddam did what it took to decisively lose.
The upshot is that Moscow and Baghdad underhandedly worked together to hand
the West an illusory Gulf victory.
The purpose behind such a deception would likely involve an overall
Eastern strategy to dominate the world by fighting and winning a third
world war. Saddam stomached a humiliating defeat in order to augment a
false sense of security in the West and help Soviet Russia completely win
over Western trust. This, in turn, has opened the way for Moscow to dupe
the West into lowering its guard, thus creating an opportunity for the East
to launch a successful surprise attack.
Due in large part to the Gulf Crisis, the world may today be on the
brink of what would undoubtedly be the the Mother of All Wars. It is
rather apparent that an attack from the East would today be a total
surprise. Furthermore, in the wake of its Gulf 'victory', America has
increasingly let down its military guard, particularly against a Russian
nuclear attack. {For instance, America's strategic command has been
disbanded, a sizable part of the U.S. ICBM arsenal has been deactivated,
many attack-warning satellites and radar installations have been shutdown,
and almost all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons abroad have been pulled home-
including those which were on naval vessels (70).} All in all, the proper
conditions have developed for the East to launch a successful surprise
attack against the West. The Persian Gulf Crisis may have been a seductive
lie which was created toward this ultimate End.
"The harvest in the Mother of Battles has succeeded...
the greater harvest and its yield will be in the time to come..."
{comment by Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War}
(71)
(Notes and References to this paper are in the next document.)
* * * * * *
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***EPILOGUE: THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION***
-Outline of Epilogue-
A. Introduction
B. Another Persian Gulf Crisis
C. False Peace in the Middle East
D. The Balkans and the Caucasus
E. The (Open) Rise to Power of the Russian Right
F. Conclusion
G. References
* * * * * *
EPILOGUE: December, 1992
-Introduction-
Some two years after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein
continues to provoke the West. In the wake of his seeming defeat in the
Gulf war, Saddam has repeatedly violated United Nations' resolutions
against Iraq and has pursued campaigns of brutal internal repression which
have been internationally condemned. His provocations have brought the
world to the brink of renewed hostilities in the Persian Gulf several
times, but fortunately Iraq keeps backing down.
That Saddam continues to provoke the West is inconsistent with Iraq's
best interest but is favorable to Western interests. By continuing to
aggravate the United Nations and the Western powers, Saddam is reducing the
chances for the international sanctions against Iraq to be lifted. Also,
he is making it virtually impossible for Iraq to reenter the world
community such that Iraqi political, economic, and, eventually, military
power can be rebuilt. Lastly, Saddam's troublesome behavior has provided
the West reason and support for renewing hostilities and seeking to oust
the Iraqi dictator from power.
Saddam's seemingly irrational, self-destructive behavior can be made
sense of in the context of a grand strategy by the East to deceive and
defeat the West.
In waging a third world war, the East would seek to win popular control
of the world along side military control. To do this, the blame for war
must be shifted on to the West. This is because whoever is held
responsible for causing the immense holocaust of world war three will be
the focus of unprecedented popular hate. Thus, if it can be staged such
that global war appears to be the West's fault, then people will support,
rather than resist, an effort by the East to defeat the Western powers and,
in turn, dominate the world.
The exact set-up which could be used to frame the West likely involves
a future, unprecedented international crisis or series of crises that will
end in global war triggered from the Middle East. The stage for this may
currently be under development in the form of persistent Iraqi provocations
against the West, Arab/Israeli peace negotiations, a rising tide of
nationalism and ethnic warfare-particularly in Yugoslavia and the Caucuses,
and increasing political turmoil in Russia.
-Another Persian Gulf Crisis-
A logical explanation for Saddam's continuous and apparently irrational
provocations is that he wants the West to resume hostilities and/or seek an
overthrow of his dictatorship.
On several occasions now Saddam has violated United Nations resolutions
against Iraq and has brought forth serious confrontations with the Western
powers. After a "No-Fly Zone" was established over northern Iraq to
protect Iraqi Kurds, Iraq moved missiles and used radar to threaten allied
flights. After an ultimatum from the Western powers, Saddam backed down
and removed the missiles. Last July, Iraq refused to admit weapons
inspectors to its Ministry of Agriculture headquarters. After the Security
Council threatened to use force, Iraq allowed the inspectors in. On top of
these military confrontations, Saddam has irritated the United Nations and
the West by frustrating numerous weapons inspections, failing to fully
disclose information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, apparently
hiding SCUD missiles, planting bombs on trucks carrying aid to the Kurds,
harassing United Nations officials working inside Iraq, rejecting terms of
U.N.-monitored oil sales intended to pay compensation to victims of the
Kuwaiti invasion, and boycotting meetings of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary
commision and rejecting some of its findings. All in all, Saddam has
persistently antagonized the United Nations and the Western powers in ways
which may eventually result in renewed hostilities.
On top of provoking confrontations with the United Nations, Saddam's
antagonism has led the West to seek an overthrow of the Iraqi dictator. By
creating militarily-enforced 'No-Fly Zones', the West has effectively
partitioned Iraq into three separate states, thereby cornering Saddam: the
Kurd's have the North, the Shiite's have the South, and Saddam is trapped
in the middle. Besides cornering Saddam, America and the Western allies
have helped organize, and have pledged support for, forces inside Iraq
seeking to oust Saddam Hussein from power. For instance, the West has
backed the development of the 'Iraqi National Congress', a conglomeration
of various groups inside Iraq that are opposed to Saddam. The Congress is
currently seeking to replace the government in Baghdad by instigating a
popular internal uprising and/or military coup against Saddam Hussein's
dictatorship.
The reason Saddam wants the West to resume fighting and/or try and
overthrow his regime would most likely have to do with preparing the way
for Iraq to trigger war in the Middle East. By provoking Western military
intervention and/or staging an overthrow attempt, Saddam creates the
perfect excuse for taking seemingly last-resort, kamikazee action against
Israel and the West. This would likely involve, at the least, a chemical
SCUD attack against Israel {which would 'make fire eat up half of Israel',
just as Saddam had threatened to do a few months prior to invading Kuwait
(1)}. Because such an attack on Israel would stem from apparently blatant
Western aggression against Saddam's Iraq, the 'imperialist' West will be
held responsible for the ultimate consequences.
-False Peace in the Middle East-
In the context of a grand strategy by the East to deceive and defeat
the West, the current Arab/Israeli peace talks should be considered a
strategic deception. The purpose of such a deception would likely be two-
fold: 1.) to set the stage for a 'surprise' Arab/Israeli war, and 2.) to
insure world war three is blamed on the West rather than the East.
There are numerous indications that the Arabs intend to make war rather
than peace. First off, the proposals for comprehensive peace recently put
forth by Syria and Jordan, two of Israel's most steadfast enemies, are
simply too unprecedented and historically inconsistent. They utterly
contradict the long-time stated intentions of Arab leaders, such as Hafez
Assad of Syria, to annihilate the Jewish state. They also contradict the
decades of extraordinary military investments made by the Arabs to make
good on their stated intentions. Recent evidence that the peace talks are
a lie comes from Syria's continuing support for terrorist attacks against
Israelis in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon. Furthermore, Syria
continues to buy increasingly sophisticated long-range SCUD missiles which
can be used for chemical attacks on Israel, and, on top of that, Hafez
Assad recently signed a 'weapons cooperation accord' with Russia according
to which Syria will receive billions of dollars worth of sophisticated
Sukhoi and MiG fighter jets along with top-of-the-line Russian tanks and
anti-missile systems (2). If, indeed, Syria were committed to peace rather
than war, such activity would have ended long ago.
If the peace negotiations are deceptive, then the ultimate aim most
likely involves some form of future Arab surprise attack. The Arabs may
very well be planning to reach a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel,
but only to secure the element of surprise and to get Israel to drop its
guard. Specifically, one important military/strategic aim of an agreement
might be an Israeli pullout from the Golan Heights- a mountainous buffer
zone which currently blocks a Syrian breakthrough. Such a pullout, along
side an Israeli false sense of security, would make the Jewish state as
vulnerable as possible to an Arab attack.
To make sure that the East is not blamed for world war three, the Arabs
would want to launch an attack against Israel in a way that appears to be
provoked by the West and Israel itself.
To start with, current Arab peace efforts, along side increasing
violence in Southern Lebanon, may be paving the way for the East to shift
blame on to the West for a future Arab/Israeli war. As the Arabs pursue
peace, they increasingly appear to be peace-oriented rather than
belligerent. Meanwhile, Israel appears to be increasingly belligerent
rather than peaceful because stepped-up terrorist attacks have provoked
Israeli raids against terrorist factions in Southern Lebanon. By linking a
future war to Israeli action in Lebanon, the Arabs could significantly
reverse any blame.
As is mentioned above, besides Lebanon, war could be set-off in the
Middle East in a way that appears to be the West's fault by having Saddam
provoke a crisis with the West and then launch a kamikazee attack against
Israel. Following an Iraqi chemical attack against the Jewish state- an
action which would revive memories of Hitler's gassing of the Jews- Israeli
retaliation will be both assured and severe (3). Israel's military
response could, in turn, be used by the Arabs- particularly Syria- as a
pretense for war that, due to the current peace efforts, would effectively
be a surprise.
All in all, by using Iraq, and possibly Lebanon, to spawn a primary
crisis, the Arabs could launch an attack against Israel and have it appear
to be the West's and Israel's fault.
In the context of a general strategy involving Russia, the goal of an
Arab attack against Israel would be its predictable consequence: to get the
West to use nuclear weapons first. It is widely recognized that Israel has
a substantial nuclear arsenal which includes nuclear missiles. Upon an
Arab breakthrough, it is believed that Israel would launch a nuclear attack
against its perceived enemies (4). This, in turn, would give Russia the
excuse it needs to launch a nuclear attack against the West and have it
appear to be 'retaliation'. Thus, because Israel would be quick to use
nuclear weapons, Russia may be planning to use a surprise Arab/Israeli war
as a catalyst for surprise nuclear attack against the West.
(It should be noted that a 'surprise' attack entails any attack
that is unexpected. In the context of today's apparent 'New World
Order' involving East/West and Arab/Israeli peace and cooperation,
both an Arab/Israeli war and/or a global East/West war would be
unexpected and effectively a surprise at present regardless of the
crisis or crises that may serve as a pretense for war.)
-The Balkans and the Caucasus-
Besides the Middle East, it appears that Moscow may use the Balkan
and/or Caucasian regions as flash-points for world war three.
On a general level, disintegrating the Soviet Union has opened the way
for a rising tide of nationalism and ethnic warfare. What's more, the
perception of a debilitated and militarily weak Russia opens the way for
strong Western military intervention the world over.
By fostering nationalist trends and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans-
principally Yugoslavia- and Caucasian countries- such as Armenia and
Azerbaijan, Russia may be seeking to provoke Western military intervention
that can be linked to the outbreak of world war three. In this way, blame
for global war can be shifted as much as possible on to West.
The focus on these regions would likely have to do with the ease of
pulling the local NATO members into large-scale war. Both the Yugoslavian
and Armenian/Azerbaijan conflicts currently underway can be escalated such
that regional war will breakout involving, at the least, Turkey- NATO's
critical East-West linchpin. This can easily be used as a pretense for
general war between the East and West.
That Moscow is planning to use the Balkan and Caucasian regions for
flashpoints is indicated by inconsistent policies and the statements of
Russian officials. With regard to Yugoslavia, even though Moscow signed an
agreement for an international embargo on arms shipments to Serbia, it is
still supplying large quantities of arms to its ex-ally (5) (Serbia is the
principal belligerent in the Yugoslavian war). Furthermore, Sergey
Yastrzhemskiy, director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
recently warned that the situation in the Balkans could lead "to a global
explosion fraught with the danger of a third world war" (6). In the
Caucasus, Moscow's calls for a diplomatic solution to the
Armenian/Azerbaijan conflict has been contradicted by policies which have
armed the local populations. Also, last May, General Yevgeny Shaposhnikov,
commander of the CIS (ex-Soviet) army, warned that foreign intervention in
the region "could bring the world into the third world war" (7). More
specifically, the mutual security arrangements of the CIS are arranged such
that, should Turkey intervene in Armenia- something which Turkey has
threatened to do on several occasions, the CIS would be pulled into war
against Turkey and, in turn, NATO.
-The (Open) Rise to Power of the Russian Right-
Along side underhandedly creating war in and around the Middle East, it
would be strategic for Moscow to instigate political turmoil and possibly
civil war in Russia before launching an all-out attack. From such chaos,
Moscow could stage an open rise to power by Russian neo-facists, more
commonly referred to as the "Russian Right".
If, indeed, the East has been pursuing a grand deception over the past
several years, then it is likely that Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985
entailed a dramatic ideological shift to the political right rather than
the left. At first this may seem hard to believe, but, indeed, going into
the 1980's, it was well-recognized that a shift to the right was taking
place at the top in the Soviet Union {for instance, see: Alexander Yanov's,
'The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000' (8)}.
The Russian Right is the ultimate form of facism. It is centered
around an ideology that paints Jews and Westerners as satanic elements
conspiring to overtake Russia and the world. Consequently, Russia has a
messianic calling to wage a merciless war against Israel and the West
before the world is completely controlled by evil "zionist"
(Israeli/Jewish) and "freemasonry" (Western/liberal-democratic) forces
(purportedly by the year 2000). Through this war Russia will fulfill its
destiny of saving (dominating) the world and establishing a global kingdom
of god (dictatorship of man). The pseudo-Christian underpinnings of the
Russian Right brought about a strong alliance between Rightist elements in
the government and leaders in the Russian Orthodox Church. In other words,
with the emergence of the Russian Right, the ideology surrounding Russia's
historical messianic complex shifted from Communism to Orthodoxy. (9)
There were numerous indications that Gorbachev led a rise to power by
the Russian Right. First off, Gorbachev's background in the Komsomols
(Young Communists) involved participation in anti-semitic activities under
Stalin (10). It was these anti-semitic programs which were the roots from
which the Russian Right emerged {especially in the context of Young
Guardism (11)}. Since Gorbachev eventually became a leading figure in the
Komsomols, there is reason to believe he was involved in the emergence of
the Russian Right (12). His remarkably fast rise into the Politburo under
Brezhnev (Gorbachev was only 50 when he entered the Politburo whereas the
average age of a member was over 70) indicates he was tied to an extremely
powerful movement which, at that time, would have most likely been the
Right. During the 1970's, the Russian Right was seeking to bring about a
top-down revolution. By achieving power at the top, the neo-facist
ideology of the Russian Right could be spread downward to the people (13).
This is exactly what happened under Gorbachev.
Soon after Gorbachev came to power and initiated his policy of
Glasnost, or openess, the neo-facist ideology of the Russian Right began to
be introduced to the Russian people through supposedly grassroot
organizations which were, in fact, created and financed by the KGB.
Probably the ultimate example of this is an organization called 'Pamyat'.
Pamyat was underhandedly created by the Soviet government and the KGB
supposedly as an independent organization devoted to renovating and
restoring Russian monuments, museums, historical sights, and Orthodox
Churches (14). Quickly, however, it transformed into a leading front for
the spread of Russian neo-facism. Pamyat and its activities under
Gorbachev could be tied to the KGB, high-level elements of the Soviet
military, and the Central Committee of the Central Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU). In fact, there were indications that Yegor Ligachev,
Gorbachev's right-hand man, and Raisa Gorbachev, Mikhail's wife, were
directly involved with Pamyat (15). Furthermore, in 1987, Gorbachev's
closest Politburo ally, Boris Yeltsin (!), held an extraordinary meeting
with Pamyat leaders (16). Following this meeting Pamyat was permitted to
use government buildings for meetings and other activities- an
unprecedented privilege. Further indicating Pamyat's connection to the
government, at the 1990 Revolution Day parade in Moscow's Red Square the
military and police kept all groups of demonstrators at least a mile away
from the parade area except for Pamyat (17). Furthermore, that year
Gorbachev appointed two people to his 13-member presidential council who
were believed to be members of Pamyat (18). One of those individuals,
Valentin Rasputin, advocated that Russian Jews ought to be tried
collectively for the murder of Jesus (19).
The linkage between Pamyat and the Soviet power structure indicates
that the Russian Right came to power with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev,
but an open rise to power by Russian neo-facism and an apocalyptic war
launched against the West will likely be carried out by a Vladimir
Zhirinovsky. Vladimir Zhirinovsky is the leader of a party misleadingly
called the Liberal Democratic Party. He was recently quoted as saying: "I
am the Almighty. I am the tyrant. I will follow in Hitler's footsteps."
(20) His purported goals are the same as Pamyat's, including the
restoration of the Byzantine empire of the East.
Zhirinovsky is evidently an agent of the KGB. A recent outside
investigation of the 1990 August coup in Moscow has uncovered documents and
evidence which establishes direct links between Zhirinovsky, the KGB, and
the CPSU under Gorbachev (21). Furthermore, the evidence indicates that
the Liberal Democratic Party effectively does not exist. Since Zhirinovsky
supposedly received six million votes and came in third in the Russian
presidential elections won by Yeltsin, the indication is that those
elections were, in fact, a fraud (22). Overall, the indication is that
Zhirinovsky is KGB and Gorbachev and Yeltsin are involved in an
unprecedented, global-scale deception.
It appears that Zhirinovsky was created to carry out the dirty work of
the Russian Right. He could prove to be the key player in launching an
all-out Russian attack against the West. To understand how and why this is
so one must first consider the 1991 August coup in Moscow.
There is good reason to believe that the August coup in the Soviet
Union was a staged deception. To understand why, simply consider that,
during a 'hardline' coup in the largest military dictatorship in world
history, it would be unlikely that the supposed main opposition- Boris
Yelstin and his counterparts- would go unarrested or unkilled. It is
outright absurd to believe that this opposition could get away with making
speeches and rallying popular support to undo the coup in the streets of
Moscow. Yet, this is supposedly what happened (23). Realistically,
however, the main opposition would be the first thing to go in a hardline
coup involving the strategically-minded KGB and Soviet military. All in
all, the August coup may have been nothing but a deception and Mikhail
Gorbachev, Boris Yelstin, and the rest of the 'ex-communist', 'ex-Soviet'
leadership, have always been and will likely always be 'hardliners' whose
intent is world domination.
The 1991 coup had a notable peculiarity which may portend a future,
bogus coup which Moscow may be planning to stage prior to launching an
attack against the West. Following the August coup, the Soviet press
emphasized how Gorbachev's 'briefcase' fell into the hands of the supposed
hardliners who threw the coup. This briefcase reportedly carried the codes
which are used to launch the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles. In other
words, it was made clear to the world how the coup could have led to a
nuclear war launched by radical hardliners. (24)
Prior to launching a third world war, it would be strategic for Moscow
to stage a rise to power by the Russian Right. First off, such a move
would be necessary to maintain the consistency of the overall deception.
Yeltsin's Russia, like Gorbachev's Soviet Union, has been painted as
progressive and peace-oriented. Thus, prior to launching a war, Russia
would want it to appear that radical hardliners are in power. This way the
world won't pick-up on the overall deception that's been underway or the
premeditated nature of Russia's attack.
By maintaining the overall deception, Russia's 'true' leaders will be
able to sidestep blame and, more importantly, they'll eventually be able to
achieve popular world control. Following an all-out offensive against the
West and military campaign to dominate the world, Russia would want to
stage a bogus 'return' to power by what have been made out to be
progressive, peace-oriented leaders- especially Mikhail Gorbachev. This
way military control of the world can be reinforced by popular control.
Instead of realizing how Gorbachev and his associates were responsible for
world destruction, people will believe these leaders saved the world from
ultimate destruction by Russian extremists.
It seems clear that Vladimir Zhirinovsky is the openly neo-facist,
hardline leader that Moscow is planning to bring to power for launching
world war three. The stage is being set so that his rise to power
parallels Hitler's rise to power in the Weimar Republic of Germany during
the 1930's. Over the past couple of years, Russia has been transformed
into a what's supposed to be a fledgling democratic nation with no
democratic heritage suffering from increasing political and economic
disintegration. This, of course, was what the Weimar Republic of Germany
was like. Now, a neo-facist dictator, Vladmir Zhirinovsky, can be carried
to power out of popular frustrations. This, of course, was how Hitler
found his way to the top. Once Zhirinovsky's is supposedly placed in
charge, possibly through some sort of bogus palace coup against Yeltsin
(keep in mind it is all staged and Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and the powers that
be are simply engaging in large-scale political deception), he then can be
used to launch a world war; again, 'following in Hitler's footsteps'.
The reason that Moscow would stage a shift to the right in a manner
which parallels the rise of facism in Germany during the 1930's is that it
makes the overall deception more believable. Nevertheless, the connections
between Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and the Russian Right, as well as the
connections between Zhirinovsky, the KGB, and the CPSU as it were, make it
clear that neo-facism found its way into the Russian power structure long
ago. What's taking place at present and what occurs in the future has been
preplanned and is bogus.
That an open rise to power by the extreme right and Vladimir
Zhirinovsky will be used to make way for an all-out war against the West is
made clear by the super-belligerent threats Zhirinovsky has been making.
First off, Zhirinovsky is calling for the forceful reestablishment of the
pre-1917 borders of the Czarist Russian empire. Furthermore, he has vowed
to wage a third world war against the West in Yugoslavia, the Caucuses, and
the Middle East. Lastly, and most importantly, Zhirinovsky recently made
his first international diplomatic trip. He went to Baghdad, Iraq.
Zhirinovsky has pledged to support Saddam Hussein in waging war against
Russia's and Iraq's common enemies of the West, Israel, and Turkey. What
is more, Zhirinovsky has stated that he will not hesitate to use weapons of
mass destruction in that effort. (25)
-Conclusion-
All in all, by underhandedly provoking war in and around the Middle
East along side staging a radical power shift to the extreme right in
Russia, Moscow creates the ideal scenario for fighting and winning a third
world war against the West. By instigating the collapse of Soviet
Communism and pursuing world peace over the past several years, Moscow has
secured surprise and duped the West into dropping its guard. This has also
made it possible to frame the Western powers such that world war three
appears to be their fault. Lastly, the way has been opened for Russian
Orthodoxy to replace Communism. Now with the West vulnerable but
aggressive, Moscow can underhandedly provoke Western military intervention
at various flashpoints of a third world war. Principally, the West can be
pulled into conflict in the Persian Gulf (Iraq), the Balkans (Yugoslavia),
the Caucuses (Armenia/Azerbaijan), and the Middle East (Arab/Israeli).
Meanwhile, an open rise to power by Russian neo-facists can be staged such
that Moscow can launch its attack without exposing the overall deception.
Suddenly faced by the militant dictator Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Western
military action in and around the Middle East can be used as an excuse for
all-out war, including a massive nuclear strike against the West- likely in
response to a last-ditch Israeli nuclear attack during an Arab overrun.
After the dust settles, the West will have been utterly defeated by the
East from an attack which came as a complete surprise. What is worse, the
horrific war will be blamed on the imperialistic efforts of the West rather
than the guilty East. The stage will be set for Mikhail Gorbachev to
'reemerge' to power in Russia. Orthodoxy can be established in the place
of Communism and Gorbachev can declare himself world savior. Thus, Russia
will have achieved both military and popular dominance of the world.
As for Saddam Hussein, the reason for his seemingly irrational, self-
sacrificial actions thus far would finally become clear. Through his
cooperation with Moscow, Saddam may eventually achieve both military and
popular dominance in the Moslem world. If events generally proceed as is
spelled out above, then, after the dust settles, Saddam would emerge as an
ultimate hero of the Arab and Moslem people. Just as it appeared to be all
over for him, Saddam managed to completely turn circumstances around such
that utter defeat was brought to his 'imperialist' enemies of the West:
Israel, America, and the Western allies. Thus, Saddam will be able to
establish popular dominion over Persia and possibly the entire Moslem
world. Saddam's power will likely be reinforced by his central role in a
Russian/Moslem military alliance to be 'openly' forged later on.
* * * * *
REFERENCES
1. "A Slow Slide Toward War". 'Newsweek': 7/2/90; 28.
2. "Major Russia-Syria Arms Sale Reported". 'The Washington Times':
11/3/92; A2.
3. "U.N. Team Looking for SCUD Missiles that may be Hidden". 'Agence
France Presse': 10/18/92.
4. Hersch, Seymour. 'The Samson Option: Israel's Nucler Arsenal and
American Foreign Policy'. Randome House; New York, NY: 1991.
5. "Washington Whispers". 'U.S. News and World Report': 8/10/92; 18.
6. "Foreign Ministry Briefing Covers Yugoslavia, Estonia and Lebanon".
'BBC Summary of World Broadcasts': 6/9/92.
7. "The Question of Azerbaijan; Nationalism Unleashed - I". 'The Nation':
9/14/92; 241.
8. Yanov, Alexander. 'The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000'. Basil
Blackwell; New York, NY: 1987.
9. See (8).
10. "Moscow's Gorbachev: A New Leader in the Old Mold". 'Heritage
Foundation Reports': 8/29/85.
11. See (8).
12. "The Rise and Fall of Gorbachev". 'Los Angeles Times': 12/26/91; A1.
13. To the Russian Right this top-down revolution is in the context of
"The Great Transformation". See (8).
14. Bortin, Mary Ellen. "Russian Heritage Group Said to Fan Nationalist
Hysteria". 'Reuters': 6/2/87.
15. Simes, Dimitri. "Extremists Flourish in Gorbachev Era". 'Los Angeles
Times': 6/25/87; part 2/p5.
16. "Russian Nationalism Spreads; Moscow Group Holds Public Protest". 'The
Washington Post': 5/24/87; A25.
17. "Prizewinner's Ways". 'Forbes': 1/7/91; 10.
18. "Gorbachev Appeases Hard-liners, Names 2 Russians to Inner Circle".
'The Washington Times': 4/26/90; A11.
19. "Yeshiva University Should've Known Better". 'The Jerusalem Post':
5/19/92.
20. "Russia: Hardline Communists Take Road to Facism". 'The Independent':
12/1/92; 11.
21. "Accusations by the White House". 'Current Digest of the Soviet
Press': 1/29/92; 23.
22. "Communist Losers Offer Excuses for Russian Poll Defeat". 'The Times':
6/15/91.
23. For a comprehensive review of events during the 1991 August coup in
Moscow, see: "Three Days That Shook the World". 'U.S. News & World
Report': 11/8/91; 52.
24. "Where's was the Black Box?". 'Time': 9/2/91; 43.
25. "In Russia, It's Us vs. Them; Nationalists Preach Hate, Militarism".
'Newsday': 12/29/92; 12.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
***THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION***
-Notes & References-
"The great masses of the people...
will more easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one."
(Adolph Hitler)
From: 'Mein Kampf', Chapter 10.
"We have no right ever to forget that psychological warfare
is a struggle for winning people's minds."
(Mikhail Gorbachev)
From: "Soviet Disinformation Chief:
A Master at Using Words as Cold-War Weapons",
'The New York Tribune': 7/27/87.
NOTES
1. General Schwarzkopf made this comment while answering questions from
the press following the Gulf War.
2. This idea is covered in depth in another paper I wrote entitled: "The
Total Lie".
The main purpose of a grand deception would be to set the stage for a
Russian nuclear surprise attack. To understand how this could be,
simply consider the following three points:
I) The seeming collapse of Soviet communism has almost completely
undone Western expectations of a preemptive nuclear attack. This
entails that:
a) Russia can currently launch the 10,000+ nuclear weapons it
still has targetted against America and its allies, and it will
be a complete surprise. In other words, because we no longer
expect it, Russia can now launch a 'surprise' attack.
That this is what Moscow has been planning the whole time would
explain why military spending went up under Gorbachev in stark
contradiction to the supposedly peace-oriented change in
Moscow's foreign policy (i). It would also explain why the
Soviets concentrated on expanding and modernizing their
strategic nuclear forces over the past seven years while at the
same time forging and signing agreements with the West to get
rid of such weapons (ii).
b) Since it is not expected, America and its allies have
increasingly dropped their guard against a nuclear attack, thus
the West is now most vulnerable to one (see note 70).
II) The disintegration of the Soviet empire not only has minimized
Western perceptions of the Soviet military threat, it has reduced
Soviet vulnerability to Western nuclear retaliation. By letting
go of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics, Moscow has
constrained its vulnerable targets to Mother Russia. Thus,
roughly two-thirds of its previous empire is now safe from Western
nuclear retaliation following a Russian attack- and that's not
counting unconnected puppet states like Cuba (iii).
The idea that the breakup of the Soviet empire was intentional is
substantiated by reports that the KGB instigated, rather than
sought to repress, the popular uprisings in, at the least, the
Eastern European states (iv). Furthermore, it explains why the
Soviets never used military force to restore order and control in
their empire as had been done throughout the previous 70 years.
Lastly, an intentional breakup would explain what interest the
Communist Party had in voting itself out of existence.
III) A major element of the Soviet Union's seeming demise has been an
economic collapse and increasingly severe food crisis. The
failure of the Soviet economy has been rather peculiar, however,
in that, as production and employment remained high, the
availability of goods for consumers dwindled. This has been
attributed to failures in the Soviet distribution system.
However, that goods have been produced but not consumed indicates
that a large surplus is being lost somewhere. While Western
analysts have concluded that there has been a tremendous amount of
waste, in the context of a Soviet grand deception to wage a
surprise nuclear war, it would make sense that the Soviets have
been using an economic crisis as a cover for mass stockpiling.
This would be consistent with how Moscow has spent hundreds of
billions of dollars on elaborate and comprehensive civil defense
programs which have rivalled Soviet strategic arms programs in
both cost and scale (v). It would also explain why shortages have
persisted even though many food warehouses throughout Russia are
full- partially due to generous Western aid (vi). Lastly, such an
economic deception would explain why Western intelligence found
that Soviet officials began systematically 'under'-estimating
economic output and potential after Gorbachev came to power (vii).
i. Specifically, Soviet defense expenditures increased by 3
percent per year in real terms under Gorbachev. See:
'Soviet Military Power'. US Department of Defense;
Washington, DC: (esp. 1989).
ii. See, for instance:
Cline, Ray (ed). 'Behind the Smile Are Teeth of Iron'. US
Global Strategy Council; Washington, DC: 1989.
iii. In terms of population and economic potential. Regarding US
and NATO retargetting activities, see:
Kruzel, Joseph. '1991-92 American Defense Annual'. Lexington
Books; Lexington, MA: 1992; 76-77.
iv. Leonard, Paul. "Countdown to Destruction". 'Fatima Crusader':
10-11/90; 14.
v. See, for instance:
'Soviet Military Power': 1988.
Broder, John. "Underground Shelters Built for Soviet
Leaders". 'Los Angeles Times': 4/30/88: I,16.
vi. See, for instance:
Parks, Michael. "Food Shipments Trapped in Web of Soviet
Inefficiency". 'Los Angeles Times': 12/11/90; A6.
Blitz, James. "Hunger in the Heart of Plenty". 'The Sunday
Times': 12/9/90.
vii. Epstein, Edward. 'Deception: The Invisible War Between the
KGB and the CIA'. Simon and Schuster; New York, NY: 1989;
241.
For an overview of Soviet strategy for surprise nuclear war, see:
Douglass, Joseph D., Jr. 'Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War'. Hoover
Institute Press; Stanford, CA: 1979.
Van Cleave, Dr. William R. "Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces and Goals:
Deception and Surprise". From: 'Mesmerized By The Bear' Sleeper,
Raymond (ed). Dodd, Mead, & Co. New York, NY: 1987; 89-109.
For an overall idea of how and why the military powers of the East- led
by Soviet Russia- may be pursuing a grand strategy to deceive and
militarily conquer the West, see:
Beichman, Arnold. 'The Long Pretense: Soviet Treaty Diplomacy from
Lenin to Gorbachev'. Transaction Publishers; New Brunswick, NJ: 1991.
Cline, Ray (ed). 'Behind the Smile Are Teeth of Iron'. US Global
Strategy Council; Washington, DC: 1989.
Daily, Brian and Patrick Parker (eds). 'Soviet Strategic Deception'.
Lexington Books; Lexingtion, MA: 1987.
Douglass, Joseph D., Jr. 'Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War'. Hoover
Institute Press; Stanford, CA: 1979.
Epstein, Edward Jay. 'Deception: The Secret War Between the KGB and the
CIA'. Simon & Schuster; New York, NY: 1989.
Golitsyn, Anatoliy. 'New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of
Deception and Disinformation'. Dodd, Mead; New York, NY: 1984.
Kintner, William. 'Soviet Global Strategy'. Hero Books; Fairfax, VA:
1987.
Kintner, William and Harriet Scott (eds). 'The Nuclear Revolution in
Soviet Military Affairs'. University of Oklahoma Press; Norman, OK:
1968.
Sleeper, Raymond (ed). 'Mesmerized By The Bear'. Dodd, Mead, & Co.
New York, NY: 1987.
3. "A Slow Slide Toward War". 'Newsweek': 7/2/90; 29.
4. Information compiled from various news sources. For a thorough
analysis of Saddam's military going into the Gulf War, see:
Darwish, Adel and Gregory Alexander. 'Unholy Babylon'. St. Martin's
Press. New York, NY: 1991; 85-178.
5. Kondracke, Morton. "Saddamnation". 'The New Republic': 5/7/90; 10-11.
6. "The Guns of August". 'The New Republic': 9/3/90; 9.
7. "A Slow Slide Toward War".
8. Kondracke; 10.
9. Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris. 'Saddam's War'. Faber & Faber, Inc.
Winchester, MA: 1991; 1-2.
10. Bulloch and Morris; 102.
11. Bulloch and Morris- also see:
"Standing up to Saddam Hussein". 'Economist': 7/28/90; 11-12.
12. Kruzel, Joseph (ed). '1991-92 American Defense Annual'. Lexington
Books; Lexington, MA: 1992; 1.
13. "The Guns of August".
14. For a synopsis of Resolution 660, see: Darwish and Alexander; 308.
15. For a thorough "Diary of the Gulf Crisis", see: Darwish and Alexander;
299-307.
16. Bulloch and Morris; 5.
17. Darwish and Alexander; 299-307.
18. Kruzel; 107.
19. Kruzel; 1.
20. "US Says Early Air Attack Caught Iraq Off Guard". 'New York Times'.
1/18/91; A10.
21. Grier, Peter. "Iraq's Chemical Weapons Found to be Potent".
'Christian Science Monitor': 1/23/92; 1.
Also from Associated Press (AP) reports taken off Dow Jones News
Retrieval on April 19, 1991.
22. For a thorough examination of Iraqi development and usage of chemical
weapons, see: Darwish and Alexander; 101-114.
23. Grier; 1.
24. Darwish and Alexander; 112.
25. "The Fury of Desert Storm". 'U.S. News & World Report': 3/11/91; 74.
26. Tyler, Patrick E. "Iraq's War Toll Estimated by U.S.; 100,000 Killed
and 300,000 hurt in Persian Gulf cited as tentative figures". 'New
York Times': 6/5/91; A5.
27. "The 100-Hour War". 'U.S. News & World Report': 3/11/91; 16.
28. "The 100-Hour War".
29. "U.N. Survey Calls Iraq's War Damage Near-Apocalyptic". 'New York
Times': 3/22/91; A1.
30. "The 100-Hour War".
31. "Intelligence in a World of Change (Satellites and Humans)".
'Government Executive' (serial): National Journal, Inc.; Washington,
DC: 3/92.
32. For a thorough examination of Iraq's nuclear program, see: Darwish and
Alexander; 178-196.
33. Widely reported in the summer of 1991.
Meisler, Stanley. "300 Iraq SCUDs Missing, U.N. Team Reports". 'Los
Angeles Times': 11/2/91; A10.
(also from CNN news reports)
34. Epstein, Edward Jay. "Virtual Ally: What's the Soviet Game in the
Gulf?". 'The New Republic': 9/3/90; 19-20.
35. Bulloch and Morris; 20.
-the Soviets also profitted from their huge gold, silver, and diamond
exports, because precious metals and gems went up in value sharply
with the Crisis.
36. Epstein; 19, 20.
37. Kondracke; 12.
38. McAlvany, Don. "Middle East Aflame: Oil Wars in the Persian Gulf".
'McAlvany Intelligence Advisor' (serial). Phoenix, AZ: 8/90.
Reprinted in:
'The Fatima Crusader' (serial). Constable, NY: 10-11/90; 5-10.
39. Morris, Robert. 'Our Globe Under Siege III'. Better Baby;
Philadelphia, PA: 1988; 182.
Referenced in: 'McAlvany Intelligence Advisor' (see note 35).
Specifically, Morris quoted columnist Paul Scott who listed eight
facilities which included:
1) A major naval facility at Umn Qasr at the mouth of the Shaat-al
Arab which flows into the Persian Gulf. This base includes
maintenance facilities for ships and basing for equipment and
ammunition. There are also boarding ramps for Hovercraft that can
transport naval infantry from the base.
2) The naval installations and facilities at Zubior and al Qurnah,
the former on a body of water below the Euphrates River and the
latter on the Tigris. Both ports can service Soviet warships.
3) There are air bases at Sulaymaniyah in the northeast mosul in the
north central sector of the country.
40. Darwish and Alexander; 136.
41. "Moscow Fears Iraq Won't Pay Back Big Debt". 'Oil & Gas Journal':
9/17/90; 28.
42. Rosenthal, A. M. "Why Moscow Wants to Save Saddam".
Printed in:
Sifry, Micah and Christopher Cerf (eds). 'The Gulf War Reader:
History, Documents, Opinions'. Times Books; New York, NY: 1991; 346.
43. Mann, Paul. "Judging the Soviets in the Gulf: Are They as Weak as They
Look?". 'Aviation Week & Space Technology': 12/3/90; 24.
44. "Iraq Hints at Flexibility; Allies Focus Bombardment". 'Gannett News
Service': 2/12/91.
45. Howard, Michael and Robert Lovett. "The Burdens of Victory". 'U.S.
News & World Report': 7/13/91; 48-49.
46. Darwish and Alexander; 283.
47. Mann.
48. Bulloch and Morris; 20.
49. Private source.
50. For instance, see:
Sterling, Claire. 'The Terror Network: The Secret War of International
Terrorism'. Berkley Books; New York, NY: 1982.
51. Epstein; 20.
52. Kondracke; 10.
53. McAlvany.
54. Epstein.
55. Epstein.
56. Leonard, Paul. "Countdown to Destruction". 'The Fatima Crusader': 10-
11/90; 13.
57. "Iraq Hints at Flexibility; Allies Focus Bombardment".
58. 'The American Sentinel' (serial). Phillips Publishing Co.;
Washington, DC: 8/90.
Quoted in: "Newspage". 'The Fatima Crusader': 10-11/90; 11.
59. Walte, Juan. "U.S. Tried to Nab Soviets Aiding Iraq". 'USA Today':
3/19/91; A4.
Also see:
"Some Secrets of Gulf War Might Never Be Told". 'Gannett News
Service': 3/19/91.
"Iraq Hints at Peace Effort; Demands End to Air War; U.S. Cautious".
'USA Today': 2/13/91; A1.
60. Many people have indicated a belief that Western intelligence must be
aware of the potential for a Soviet grand deception or deception in
the Gulf as is spelt out in my views. However, this a false belief
premised on ignorant and irrational faith. If Western intelligence
had any suspicion of a deception, the West would never have dropped
its guard the way it has- particularly against a nuclear surprise
attack. Every indication is that Western 'intelligence' has been
outsmarted by the 'intelligencia' of the East. To better understand
how this could be so, see:
Epstein, Edward Jay. 'Deception: The Secret War Between the KGB and
the CIA'. Simon & Schuster; New York, NY: 1989.
Golitsyn, Anatoliy. 'New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of
Deception and Disinformation'. Dodd, Mead; New York, NY: 1984.
It should be noted here that, if the Soviets have succeeded in
misleading us, it is not due so much to their deceptions as to our own
self-deceptions. Lenin once said that the best way to overcome the
West was to: 'tell them what they want to hear'. It seems Gorbachev
may have carried this logic one step further to: 'show them what they
want to see'. The point is that Westerners have proven time and time
again that they will 'hear what they want to hear' and 'see what they
want to see' regardless of the truth of the matter. In other words,
our selfish fears, pride, and desires, mislead us into accepting
illusions- lies- rather than reality and the truth. Hitler realized
this and used it to his advantage resulting in World War II and the
virtual loss of free-Europe. Now it appears history may be repeating
itself and the consequence will be World War III and the loss of the
free-world.
61. See note 2.
62. Most of these are readily apparent points- for specific examples see:
Howard; 44. Also see:
Schoenfeld, Gabriel. "The Loser of the Gulf War Is... the Soviet
Military." (editorial) 'Wall Street Journal': 3/19/91; A24.
63. That the Soviets are planning to invade Europe later on would explain
why they left large stocks of ammunition in Eastern Europe in the wake
of their military pull-out.
See: Kruzel, 222.
64. Birnbaum, Jesse. "How Many Wars Can the U.S. Fight?". 'Time'. 3/4/91;
38-39.
65. Birnbaum; 38.
66. Montgomery, Paul L. "NATO Is Planning to Cut U.S. Forces in Europe by
50%". 'New York Times': 5/29/91; A1.
67. "Spirit of CFE Treaty Disappears East of the Urals". 'Financial
Times': 11/15/90; (European News), 2.
"A Factor in the Soviet Food Crisis". 'New York Times': 1/4/91; A4.
68. Mendelsohn, Jack. "Just How Deceitful are the Soviets?" (editorial)
'Wall Street Journal': 2/26/91; A15.
69. "A Glimpse at the Troubled Soviet Army". 'U.S. News & World Report':
12/17/90; 54.
70. In late September of 1991, George Bush ordered that the U.S.
strategic bomber fleet be stood-down and dismantled and that all
Minuteman II ICBM's be deactivated. Furthermore, he announced that
all tactical nuclear weapons were to be pulled off U.S. naval vessels
and 80 percent of American nuclear defenses in Western Europe were to
be removed. These goals are today complete (completion date: July 1,
1992). This information is widely available in popular press reports.
For a report on how America's guard against a Soviet nuclear sneak
attack has been significantly lowered, see:
"Why America New Sentinel Works Only a 40-Hour Week". 'U.S. News &
World Report': 5/20/91.
71. Comments following the Gulf War. 'The New York Times': 3/3/91; E2.
* * * * *
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